



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

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THESIS

**RETHINKING GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT - THE
REQUIREMENT FOR KNOWLEDGE BEFORE ACTION**

by

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June 2005

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**RETHINKING GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT - THE REQUIREMENT FOR
KNOWLEDGE BEFORE ACTION**

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ABSTRACT

The type of engagement necessary for US security is not compatible with the interests of today's US SOF. America requires a Global Engagement Plan (GEP) that is unprecedented in its patience and persistence, and that maintains a diffuse presence everywhere on the planet. Such a plan envisions and necessitates deliberate, intimate, and continuous American contact with sizeable segments of the world's population -- the predominantly non-elite majority that is inadequately observed and reported on by extant instruments of American power. Operatives tasked with executing the GEP would be permanently immersed in the host environment, taking a U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) mantra to "operate by, with, and through indigenous forces and peoples" to an extreme. Current American governmental structures and methods of foreign engagement are unequal to such a task. America already has a force whose mission includes acting as "global scouts": SF. Nevertheless, the traditional method of SF employment is inadequate to providing such deliberate, intimate, and continuous observation and reporting. A better method of global engagement can be found in both a Regional Engagement Concept (REC) for (military) soldiers, and a proposed Global Engagement Agency within the Department of State for (civilian) operatives. Retired and/or transitioned SF soldiers provide an ideal nucleus for the forming of such an agency.

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J.L.H.

Monterey, June 2005

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I. INTRODUCTION

To meet the challenges of the twenty-first century – a century which promises continuing friction between the forces of modern globalization and traditional patterns of human order – America will need to make use of every available mode of engagement. It is therefore useful and necessary to periodically review the way in which America engages the world. This thesis argues that American security and national interests would be well-served by engaging the world in a deliberately diffused manner. A proposed Global Engagement Plan (GEP) would permanently place American civilian operatives in every micro-region of the world to observe and report information in human environments that are under-observed, and whose activities are under-reported. Such operatives would: (1) establish a permanent and continuous American presence at a foreign local level; (2) provide an additional means to observe and report ground truth of such foreign environments on an unprecedented scale; (3) provide open source human information on foreign populations and environments useful to verification of local conditions, foreign government behavior toward their population, and American Government agencies' and non-governmental organizations' (NGO) activities and effectiveness abroad; (4) present continuous and locally-derived foreign information useful to the coordination of all the instruments of American national power during specific events and operations; (5) provide continuous information capture and reporting for the ongoing development of national databases and policy formation beyond specific events and operations; (6) serve, where appropriate, as liaisons between foreign local micro-environments and other manifestations of American engagement policy; (7) provide, when appropriate, in-place pilot teams and bases of operation for all other instruments of national power; and (8) provide, where appropriate, operative agents of American foreign policy in pursuing the stated American interests of spreading liberty, the rule of law, human rights, and free and fair trade.

Any such operative would require multiple skills. The traditional and conventional diplomat, soldier, spy, policeman, aid worker, missionary, journalist, economic surveyor, or salesman would each possess some of the skills required of such an operative, but usually not all of them at once and in the same person. Such operatives

would require all of these skills. The indispensability of each skill should not however suggest that they are of equal importance. The diplomat and soldier skills predominate. Many parts of the world remain dangerous and even lawless. In many places, academic notions about the just exercise of power remain an unrealized or imperfectly implemented dream. Such places continue to be ruled by naked and open force, by force just under the surface of civil society, and/or force masquerading as something else. Such operatives would have to be accustomed to perceiving the many manifestations of force. They would have to be resourceful in their own defense -- especially in their role as a minority and guest of a foreign society. "Defense" would have to be based on using what was available in the host society and environment itself, not the guaranteed promise of overwhelming and intrusive American firepower. Many parts of the world lack basic facilities and comforts that would meet the most basic minimum standard of typical American life. Therefore, such operatives would have to be physically tough and uncommonly tenacious in the face of physical hardship. They would have to be accustomed to surviving and operating in environments devoid of the modern pleasures of the most-developed world. They would have to be uncommonly resilient and resourceful to remain (sometimes discretely) in-place, to survive, and to continuously function as observers and reporters.¹ And they would require individual brilliance in dealing with foreign peoples.² Their quest would be to transition from strange minority outsider to an accepted minority guest and acceptable local representative of America's permanent engagement. America already has such operators extant in the United States Army Special Forces (SF) if America only had the vision and political will to use them in

1 Jones, R.V. (1965). Chance observation and the alert mind. In B. Whaley (Ed.), *An Intelligence Reader* (2nd ed.). Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School. pp. 633-644. Jones' discussion of scientific advance is deliberately and directly parallel to useful truths in intelligence work. "Chance favors the trained observer, so that the skilled, alert observer is able to take advantage of the accident of experiment, which may show him something quite different from, or well beyond, what he is looking for.... It may indicate that past thought has been on the wrong track (p. 637) "No matter how humble the field of science in which one is working, the same truth holds -- the alert observer always has a special contribution to make. It need not necessarily be in pure science. It can be in technology, in everyday life, in the detection of crime, or even in war (p. 642)."

2 Simons, A. & Tucker, D. (2004). *Improving Human Intelligence In The War On Terrorism: The Need For An Ethnographic Capability*. Paper as yet not publicly released, submitted to the Office of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School. Simons & Tucker's paper identifies many of the same problems discussed in this thesis. They provide examples of the kind of intellect, temperament, and dedicated employment required of those who could effectively serve as the observers envisioned by this thesis. The examples include anthropologists, Imperial British Army officers, and a trio of renowned women travelers.

such a role. Unfortunately, the military has not chosen to use SF in such a sustained manner. Given the relatively short-term and instrumental focus of the military, it may be more prudent to expand the Department of State (DOS) by creating a subordinate Global Engagement Agency (GEA) with a charter to engage the areas outside of traditional foreign policy coverage. This thesis argues that the implementation of a Regional Engagement Concept (REC) could improve military engagement, while retired and/or transitioned SF soldiers could form the nucleus of a GEA.

A. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis argues that America should develop a Global Engagement Plan (GEP) that is unprecedented in its patience and persistence, and that maintains a diffuse presence everywhere on the planet. Such a plan envisions and necessitates deliberate, intimate, and continuous American contact with the (predominantly non-elite) majority of the world's population. Because the operatives tasked with executing the plan would be permanently immersed in the host environment, such contact would take an SF mantra to "operate by, with, and through indigenous forces and peoples" to an extreme. The thesis begins by discussing why current American governmental structures and methods of foreign engagement are unequal to the task (Chapter II).

America already has a force whose mission includes acting as "global scouts": SF. Nevertheless, the traditional method of SF employment is inadequate to providing such deliberate, intimate, and continuous observation and reporting. In Chapter III, this thesis will review and critique a method by which SF soldiers can be better employed to conduct Regional Engagement in a military context. It will then proceed to propose a vastly expanded version -- the GEP -- which augments traditional observation and reporting activities through a new civilian agency subordinate to the DOS. Chapter IV will summarize the thesis and its conclusions.

B. IDENTIFICATION OF THE ESSENTIAL PROBLEM

America is currently the world's strongest military and economic power, with global reach and resources so great, that when an issue of interest is clearly identified and the political will to address it is wielded, America can bring shattering power to bear.

Nevertheless, there are real limits to the reach of American power and influence, based on – among other things - a lack of information on, and a lack of consistent engagement in, the wider world. America continues to engage the world officially and primarily as a national state in a familiar system of states in an otherwise anarchic world system. As numerous commentators have noted, however, the state appears to be in a period of relative decline, and the 21st century will see increasing engagement with non-state, non-traditional actors of an asymmetric proportion.³

Current American government structures and methods of engagement with the world rely on state-to-state reporting of conditions. Other states' subject populations are predominantly engaged only indirectly. Regardless of the quality or level of probity in such foreign regimes, America continues to rely predominantly on traditional regime-to-regime relations and reporting of host nation conditions. This may allow the true conditions of foreign mass populations to remain underappreciated, or even to remain hostage to the whims of foreign regime representation. In many cases, direct American engagement with such populations could improve American understanding of ground truth in foreign environments, leading to the formulation of better American policy. In some instances, such expanded and more direct engagement with, observation of, and reporting on, the majority of the world's population could forestall and preempt the majority of the non-state, non-traditional, and asymmetric challenges that are an apparently increasing phenomenon.

America therefore requires a new and deliberate method for such engagement: the GEP. Such a method would demand paying more deliberate attention to the non-elite communities of foreign states. This represents a different emphasis from the necessary and traditional methods of American foreign engagement focused on regime-to-regime intercourse. Such a plan requires personnel with the requisite temperament, traits, and skills (TTS) to immerse themselves -- so far as is possible and consistent with American policy -- into often harsh and sometimes dangerous human micro-environments. Such "GEP operatives" (GEOs) would need to rely on the kind of cultural interoperability skills, physical and mental toughness, and routine familiarity with harsh, often poor, and

3 O'Meara, P., Mehlinger, H., & Krain, M. (Eds.). (2000). *Globalization And The Challenges Of A New Century: A Reader*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

sometimes dangerous foreign environments, that are a hallmark of Army Special Forces soldiers. Therefore, rather than simply expanding the number of DOS Foreign Service Officers (FSOs), or other U.S. Government (USG) personnel traditionally assigned to American embassies abroad, a new agency with a new kind of operative is recommended.

C. METHODS

Hypothesis: This thesis' hypothesis is that traditional methods of USG engagement with foreign populations, while necessary, are nevertheless insufficient to observe and report on the majority of the world's population in a persistent, consistent, and long-term manner. If threats to America are believed to increasingly arise from such (predominantly non-elite) masses, it would be prudent to develop an ability to conduct such observation and reporting. Army SF has the charter to act as global scouts among their array of missions. The military, however, is most often focused on more short-term instrumentality in its use of SF. To reap more persistent, consistent, and long-term observation and reporting, the military could use a REC that focuses on a more consistent presence. Given that military efforts follow (understandably) military rationales for employment, and such efforts are sometimes limited by their very military nature, it seems reasonable to make GEOs civilian operatives. Civilian operatives -- as part of the DOS mission -- would be more acceptable to many more foreign host nations than would the presence of American military personnel. Nevertheless, simply increasing the number of traditional FSOs is not an adequate solution. Permanent/near-permanent presence in such environments requires operatives to have the TTS common to SF soldiers. It is therefore recommended that such civilian DOS officials -- GEOs -- be drawn from retired/transitioned SF personnel.

Research Questions: In conducting this analysis I will address the following questions:

1. Are the traditional instruments of American power sufficient for persistent, consistent, and long-term engagement with foreign human micro environments -- an engagement that results in continuous observation and reporting of mass human communities outside of the traditional corridors of power?
2. How can military observation and reporting be improved?

3. How might a civilian method of observation and reporting be conceived?
4. What new structure might be recommended to achieve this civilian method of observation and reporting?

D. SUBSEQUENT CHAPTER SYNOPSES

1. Background and Scope of the Problem (Chapter II).

Despite its unprecedented achievements, power, and potential, America has often blundered badly in its foreign engagements *due to an insufficient understanding of the environments in which it sought and strove to engage*. America's traditional instruments of national power are inadequate to the observation and reporting of all information that would enhance American national interests and security, help prevent such blunders, and provide a proactive conduit for better understanding -- and thereby better influencing -- foreign affairs. The instruments of national power include diplomatic, economic, financial, informational, intelligence, law-enforcement, and military.⁴ It can be argued that America already possesses everything required to observe and report information in any region of the globe, that a new concept is unnecessary, and the effort and expense to realize any such new effort is unwarranted. This argument is incorrect. A new effort is required to fill the gaps in American understanding of the global environment. The thesis will examine each American instrument of national power in turn, and show why they are unequal to the task of comprehensive global engagement.

2. Models of Engagement: Improving U.S. Army Special Forces Engagement in a Possible Practical Future (the Regional Engagement Concept), and a Grand (Civilian) Conception for the Future (the Global Engagement Plan). (Chapter III)

Assuming one admits a need for a more comprehensive manner of conducting engagement activities beyond the historical pattern, one must then ask what model of employment is necessary. Chapter III revisits, analyzes, and critiques one such practical method for expanded military engagement; the Regional Engagement Concept Model

⁴ U.S. Government (2003, February). *National Strategy For Combating Terrorism*. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office. , p. 1.

(REC).⁵ Based on the review and critique of the REC, a solution for enhancing the observation and reporting inherent in expanded engagement is proposed in a broader and more comprehensive civilian Global Engagement Plan (GEP).

3. Thesis Summary (Chapter IV)

Chapter IV will briefly summarize the thesis and its conclusions.

⁵ Rothstein, H. (1999). *Regional Engagement: An Army Special Operations Forces Approach To Future Theater Military Operations*. Fort Bragg, NC: John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center & School.

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II. BACKGROUND AND SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

At the beginning of the 21st century, America finds itself *primus inter pares*, the lone “Superpower,” in a world of actors that concurrently admire it, loathe it, and always contend with it in their own continuing (and often adversarial) interests. Despite its unprecedented achievements, power, and potential, America has often blundered badly in its foreign engagements due to an insufficient understanding of the environments in which it sought and strove to engage. America’s traditional instruments of national power are inadequate to the observation and reporting of all information that would enhance American national interests and security, help prevent such blunders, and provide a proactive conduit for better understanding -- and thereby better influencing -- of foreign affairs. Since 9/11 and the advent of the GWOT, America has been re-examining the purpose, structure, and employment of these instruments in the attempt to better prepare itself for the challenges and responsibilities of the new century. Nevertheless, nothing like a GEP as proposed here has yet been asserted.

The instruments of national power include diplomatic, economic, financial, informational, intelligence, law-enforcement, and military.⁶ It can be argued that America already possesses everything required to observe and report information in any region of the globe, that a new concept is unnecessary, and the effort and expense to realize any such new effort is unwarranted. This argument is incorrect. A new effort is required to fill the gaps in American understanding of the global environment. Chapter II will examine each American instrument of national power in turn, and show why they are unequal to the task of comprehensive global engagement.

A. DIPLOMATIC

The Department of State (DOS) is America’s lead agency in dealing with foreign governments and international issues. DOS currently operates 197 embassies and consulates in 159 foreign countries worldwide.⁷ These embassies are the primary US

⁶ U.S. Government (2003, February). *National Strategy For Combating Terrorism*, p. 1.

⁷ U.S. Department of State (2005, February 26). Retrieved 26 February 2005 from http://travel.state.gov/travel/tips/embassies/embassies_1214.html

government interface with foreign governments, and the primary source of reporting on conditions in foreign lands. Because embassies are the conduit for international government to government intercourse, all embassies are located in the capitol cities of foreign countries where they have access to the top governmental leaders of each foreign nation. National power, wealth, leading industries, and leading educational institutions are typically concentrated in the capitol city. They profit from the close contact with key governmental decision makers; the highest development of economic conditions in the country; the concentration of wealth and financial power; access to the most highly developed communications; and the concentration of most leaders (“prime movers”) of all fields of endeavor in most countries. The headquarters of foreign military, intelligence, and law enforcement will also typically be located in foreign capitol cities. Because the official national power of foreign countries is condensed in their capitol cities, the DOS and other agencies resident in American embassies abroad are well-placed to engage, observe, and report on the activities of foreign prime movers and official foreign government policies. In many foreign countries, American consulates are placed in outlying major cities and/or geographically important areas to expand this interface with the foreign state. One would err, however, in assuming that everything America needed to know about the conditions in a foreign country can be provided by and through America’s foreign missions abroad as currently staffed and chartered.

American embassies’ advantage in being co-located with the centers of foreign power is concurrently a limiting disadvantage. It is necessary and appropriate that the American President’s Ambassador to any given country represent the current President’s position to the supreme official authority in the foreign government (and receive the current position of that current foreign government for relay back to the President). But official regimes and supreme authorities come and go both here and in foreign capitols. Such intercourse as occurs between foreign governmental prime movers and the American Ambassador is inescapably focused on the nuanced calculus of power among key individuals. Although such government-to-government intercourse and representation is indispensable, one must not assume that the entire intercourse amongst nations can be represented by such discrete and rational interchange. As Migdal has explained in *Strong Societies and Weak States*, it has been a common mistake to assume

that the state apparatus is more powerful and informed than it really is.⁸ Moreover, Allison & Zelikow have shown in *Essence of Decision* that even where a strong, developed government exists, it does not operate as a monolith in lock-step pursuit of a single, rational, and unifying goal.⁹ The “state” and the government that controls it are merely two actors in a larger national story. The holistic reality of any national state is much more than the state apparatus and the regime in power.¹⁰

To appreciate the larger national trends coalescing from more specific occurrences, the President (or Ambassador) relies on subordinate officials and experts to gather, collate, analyze, and report. In the American system however, the President has incomparable advantages in such reporting and analysis compared to any American Ambassador in a foreign country because official American observers can go almost anywhere to observe and report on local conditions. The President enjoys a stable and highly developed governmental structure, with conduits of information from senators and governors, congressman, mayors, county commissioners, and local sheriffs and school boards. The smaller the jurisdiction of each information-reporting echelon and the more intimate the reporter is with the holistic conditions of the local level environment, the more specific the “ground truth” of such information can become. In addition, the American government has a built-in system of accountability (representative government limited by the affirmation or condemnation through popular franchise), which is back-stopped by a free and aggressive press. No one doubts that if troublesome local conditions become a matter for national government concern that such issues will percolate up to the attention of those who can fix their attention on them. The national government, so alerted, has the resources to focus national attention and resources directly and expeditiously on any local problem. Local problems may go unobserved, of course, until tragedy strikes, local grievances expand into broad-based movements or

8 Migdal, J. (1988). *Strong Societies And Weak States: State-Society Relations And State Capabilities In The Third World.*, Princeton: Princeton University Press. pp. 10-41.

9 Allison, G. & Zelikow, P. (1999). *Essence Of Decision: Explaining The Cuban Missile Crisis*. New York: Longman. pp. 255-283.

10 If one should challenge this, just imagine what degree of daily resolution the current American President will have on the effect illegal immigration is having on street crime in Los Angeles, how weather anomalies and market disruption from declining shrimp populations could lead to increased unemployment amongst Vietnamese fisherman on the Louisiana coast, or how white, rural populations can be radicalized by media in the counties surrounding Boise, Roanoke, or Peoria.

significant damage is caused that could (in hindsight) have been avoided. Moreover, the national government may not have the requisite personnel, equipment, or procedures immediately at hand to address a local problem. Nevertheless, the ability of the US government to observe, orient, decide, and act (the so-called “OODA” loop)¹¹ on a problem of governance is beyond dispute.

Consider, by contrast, the ability of both foreign governments to respond to local foreign problems, and the American Ambassador’s ability to respond to the management of American interests in the foreign government’s response. In most highly-developed countries, the adequacy of foreign governments to respond to local crisis, the availability of a free and aggressive press, and the speed and sophistication of communications rivals that of the United States. In environments such as Japan, Great Britain, or Israel, for example, the foreign government is not only responsive to its own citizens, the information available to the American embassy will be nearly the same in quality and timeliness as that available to the host nation government. In most of these same countries, the embassy will be provided with sufficient detailed information upon query or in many cases, even unsolicited. Often the embassy will view breaking news occurring in a developed host nation on CNN in real time, and often at the same time as the host nation government. Every country, including America’s closest allies will have secrets of course, but the open-source information about the structure, events in, and trends of foreign societies upon which foreign national forecasts are made by the American embassy are relatively easy to access and assess.

In many other environments, however, the host foreign government itself has only an imperfect and time-lagged understanding of its own citizenry and national environment. Nowhere is the “state” omnipresent and omniscient; not in America, not in tiny city-states like Singapore, and not in authoritarian states like Iran and China. Even in extreme cases of state control like North Korea or the former Soviet Union, the state is limited in its perceptions and in the timeliness of its responses. For example, the number and flow of North Korean refugees into China and the indigenous mechanism of their evasion into Liaoning, or the latest developments among a restive Buryat minority, may be as opaque to Pyongyang or the Kremlin as they are to the American Embassy.

¹¹ Richards, C. (2001, Fall). *A Swift Elusive Sword: What If Sun Tzu And John Boyd Did A National Defense Review?* Paper presented at the Fall 2001 Boyd Conference. MCB Quantico, VA.

Suppose there is a development of interest in a relatively undeveloped province in a generally friendly and cooperative foreign nation such as the Philippines, Kenya, or Columbia. Assume that the province is far distant from the foreign capitol and the American embassy and even the indigenous population regards the far-flung province, its state-of-development, and its population as “backwards.” Basic developments such as clean, running water systems and sewerage, and 24-hour availability of electricity are sparse or absent. Education, if any, is meager, basic, and dominated by traditional conservative social elders. There may be few if any computers or even telephones, except perhaps in the provincial capitol. Amenities are few, the standard of living is low, and entertainments and diversions are traditional and unsophisticated. Residence or duty in such a place is not seen as desirable by the nation’s elite or middle classes. If the senior resident officials responsive to the national capitol come from outside the province, it is likely that they are posted there unwillingly and without much enthusiasm for their duties. How does the American embassy monitor what developments are occurring in the far-flung province?

The host foreign nation itself is constrained in gathering timely information on the province due to the poor communications available between the national and provincial capitols. Host nation neglect has left the province devoid of either reliable infrastructure or a populace accustomed to regarding the capitol as its benefactor. Even well-meaning national officials in the province may suffer from a bunker mentality in the midst of a hostile population. Should officials seek to perform their duties conscientiously, they may still be limited by the dearth of infrastructure (roads, fuel, etc) from routinely monitoring what occurs in the province’s outer reaches. In a routine of spotty reporting even within host nation channels, how much information will be provided by the host nation government to the American embassy?

Now assume that (for whatever reason) the local provincial populace is hostile to American interests. Assuming the American embassy is not tipped off by a happy coincidence, such as a report from a trusted indigenous friend recently returned from the province, how is the embassy to know the state of affairs? In at least some instances, the host nation government will be reticent to admit that hostile and anti-American forces constitute a part of their populace, and much more reticent to admit they cannot afford to

do much or anything about it. Direct American monitoring of the province environment may be made more difficult by travel restrictions put in place by the host nation government. These restrictions may be for the protection of their American guests, to cover up heavy-handed host nation repressive activities, or even due primarily to embarrassment at their indigenous government's limits of control. Regardless of the rationale or reasonableness of the restrictions, such restrictions make it difficult to impossible for Americans to monitor the situation first hand. Pressed for information and/or travel clearance by the American embassy, the host nation is often likely to evade, stall or outright deny access and cooperation. In some foreign nations, access to remote areas is simply not permitted.

In a majority of foreign nations, however, the difficulties of observing and reporting in remote or traditionally under-reported areas are self-imposed by America itself. There are understandable limitations on scarce resources and personnel, and the use of such resources must be prioritized to only the most pressing concerns. If the host nation government is unwilling and/or unable to provide timely and accurate information on areas of its own country, the American embassy will either dispatch its own personnel to investigate the issue at hand, or will indirectly rely on indigenous personnel to gather the information (or both). Such reliance on indigenous personnel involves a host of risks, complications and distortions that impedes timeliness and veracity, and introduces a requirement of translation from the local indigenous perspective to the national capitol perspective of the American mission. One does not argue that the necessary effort and expenditure to develop such networks of trusted indigenous operatives is not essential. Such rapport building with friendly and/or willing indigenous "co-operatives" is indispensable to building and maintaining friendly bilateral relations, enhancing goodwill toward American interests, and in information gathering. The constraints facing the embassy, however, whether by active effort of the host government, or the passive costs and constraints of developing indigenous co-operatives, limit the timeliness and veracity of information obtained. Moreover, even if American embassy officials or indigenous co-operatives make the journey to investigate, they are likely to remain in the distant province only long enough to see the current development-of-interest through; after which, the officials and co-operatives will return to the capitol. This means that

observation of the local area spikes during an action-reaction cycle spin-up, and dissipates when the development passes and the cycle once again spins down. Observation and reporting (and therefore intimate understanding) are not continuous.

The examples above already assume that the American embassy is aware of the development in the first place, and is not blind-sided by developments after they have grown beyond relatively easy local containment. It makes no great difference how fast one's OODA loop is if you never observe the development of interest to begin with. These "unknown unknowns"¹² may contain significant import and danger, and America leaves itself unnecessarily vulnerable to asymmetric threats if it neglects to observe the environments in which they breed. Most current embassy staffs are not sufficiently manned to permit the permanent deployment of their finite diplomatic staffs for continuous monitoring of local indigenous ground truth. Most American Foreign Service Officers (FSO) would frankly prefer service in the major urban centers of the foreign countries to which they are posted rather than a career in which they are predominantly "banished" to the host nation's worst backwaters; much less the worst backwaters of the world's worst backwater nations. Moreover, the traditional role of American embassies in conducting state-to-state interactions remains essential. It is clear that FSO's urbane and generalist mission profile should remain basically unchanged. Since America doesn't train its FSO's to be rugged global scouts, however - living continuously amongst the wretched of the earth - it is equally clear that the current FSO's as traditionally mandated, trained, and employed (or even ten times their current number) are not the solution to continuous observation and reporting of the world's remotest and meanest environments.

America's embassies also include many non-DOS personnel on their staffs, of course. The Department of Defense (DOD), the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and many other agencies inhabit America's foreign missions and contribute to the unified efforts of each country team. In most cases, however, these agencies are constrained by the same difficulties and obstacles pertaining

¹² Rumsfeld, D. (2002, June 6). Press Conference at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium. Retrieved February 25, 2005 from http://www.usembassy.it/file2002_06/alia/a2060711.htm "The message is that there are no 'knowns.' There are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns. That is to say there are things that we now know we don't know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There are things we don't know we don't know. So when we do the best we can and we pull all this information together, and we then say well that's basically what we see as the situation, that is really only the known knowns and the known unknowns. And each year, we discover a few more of those unknown unknowns."

to the larger embassy staff and the DOS professionals. They typically follow the same cycle of action-reaction spin-up/spin-down as the DOS. They tend to be discrete-mission oriented, seek to do most of their in-country activities through their host-nation professional counterparts, and, like their FSO colleagues are constrained in their effectiveness by not being out in the outlying provinces on a continuous basis. Even such intelligence professionals as may inhabit an American mission will conduct their work primarily in an indirect manner (through indigenous professional counterparts and co-operatives) and predominantly from the safe distance of the capitol. Moreover, the primary function of America's national intelligence is the intercourse with, and appraisal of, foreign states. As a matter of simple efficiency, it is understandable that the nation's intelligence services devote their finite resources and professional staff primarily to matters of state-to-state appraisal, and predominantly to currently "hot" issues.

Nor do military personnel resident abroad typically perform the function of continuously observing and reporting on outlying foreign environments. Military members of the embassy country team work primarily for the Ambassador. A Defense Attaché (DATT) functions as the Theater Commander's and Ambassador's senior representative and liaison to the host nation military. This means that his or her intercourse with the host nation follows the same pattern as most other functional agencies in the embassy; it will be focused on the elite prime movers in the host nation government and the monitoring of foreign state policies and activities from the official and national level. A defense attaché's information on all security-related information in the host nation will be constrained by the same frictions and limitations as other embassy agencies; sometimes more so as host nation security concerns may make host nation observation and reporting more opaque rather than less. The attaché is generally a senior military officer, and always obliged to be the military face of the embassy's diplomatic representation; he or she is a diplomat in uniform. While some individual DATTs do travel widely enough to observe and report on remote local conditions, their limited numbers and priority focus on elites does not typically provide such reporting in sufficient detail or with sufficient consistency. All of these characteristics make DATTs generally unsuited to continuous presence in outlying foreign environments and away from the host nation's seat of state power. Moreover, DATTs can only be in one place at

one time. Depending on the size, power, and importance of the host nation, the embassy's DATT may be the sole American military representative on the country team.

Most embassies will have a more robust military presence in a Defense Attaché Office (DAO). DAOs may consist of one DATT with a single administrative assistant for small countries, or they may comprise major sections of embassies in the most powerful, important, and/or most closely allied nations. A single DAO may contain numerous DATTs from different services, several additional military Foreign Area Officers (FAOs), staff officers with specialized skills such as communications or procurement, and a host of administrative, operational, and support personnel. With the exception of the FAOs, virtually all of the activities of the military personnel are constrained by the limitations mentioned previously. Moreover, the majority of DAO personnel are focused on the embassy's diplomatic requirements and the operational support of the embassy and its mission, not in continuous reporting of environmental observations. DATTs liaise through, report on, and coordinate military-to-military efforts, communicators communicate, procurers procure, and the military administrative, operational, and other support staff personnel primarily support the requirements of the embassy and the DAO itself. Beyond reporting on the host nation's military, most DAO personnel find too much of their time and focus absorbed by "operations" involving the comings and goings of military visitors, VIPs, and/or the support of temporary duty (TDY) military units and officials (where bilateral agreements with the host nation allow them). To expect that the military staffs of the DAO have the time, staff, resources, or mandate to maintain continuous observation in and reporting of regions remote from the capitol and embassy would be to assume in error. Nor would an augmented or reoriented DAO staff fill the gap in engagement and reporting if they do not fundamentally change their job descriptions/requirements to continuous presence and engagement with outlying foreign environments.

FAOs are military officers from basic branches who have a secondary career specialization that requires expertise in a particular country or region. FAOs receive good quality schooling in their assigned country's/region's history, culture, and structure. They usually receive good quality and pertinent language training prior to being assigned to an overseas posting in the embassy or Military Group (MILGROUP). Working out of the

DAO, FAOs often get the opportunity to travel widely in the host nation country during their tour. This facilitates the sharpening of their expertise, and does provide the embassy an asset to reconnoiter areas and situations of interest.

Several limitations, however, prevent the FAOs from providing continuous and intimate observation and reporting in foreign micro-environments. Although some FAOs are fortunate enough to remain in their assigned countries or regions for many years, many other FAOs' tours are generally short (2-3 years). Once their treasured in-country experience is completed, some will never return to the country in which they are "expert." Although a hand-off of information occurs between FAOs transitioning out of and into the embassies, information transfer is limited by time and to that which can be imparted in verbal, visual, and written discourse. The intimate and visceral experience of backcountry conditions largely leaves with the out-going FAO. The career development and progression of FAOs sometimes works to the advantage of maintaining country-specific and regional expertise; officers with FAO experience often progress to positions on Theater, Department of Defense (DOD) or Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) staffs for example. Sometimes the currency of the FAOs' expertise is largely lost, however, as they move to positions where their specific expertise goes unused and therefore atrophies. Even to the extent that the FAO career pipeline functions as intended and maintains the right officers in relevant jobs of increasing seniority, the FAO system is too often focused primarily on maintaining a pipeline of officers for a system of adequate coverage, rather than focused on the continuity and quality of the American engagement (and the information thereby obtained) itself. The incoming FAO will have to "engage" and learn many of the same lessons from scratch. Sometimes the knowledge gained from the FAO's experiences may become quite developed if the country is very small and conditions permit easy and constant travel. In the biggest and most complex - and often most important - countries like Russia, China, India, Brazil, or South Africa, however, opportunities to experience even a small portion of the host nation may come from "world wind tours" that provide useful general surface impressions, but hardly suffice to provide detailed, continuous observation and understanding. Moreover, the justifications for these excursions outside of the capitol are not only constrained by host nation approval, they are also usually tied to a current project of interest to the ambassador or

DATT. Like the cycle of interest in currently hot topics (as mentioned above), the FAO's primary operative focus will be on addressing the questions of a discrete and limited problem, not the monitoring of holistic conditions. Such hot topics on which the FAO is focused will usually be related to a known issue of interest to the country team. Such immediate, issue-based interest will invariably be characterized by time-constrained deductive problem-solving, not patient, holistic, and inductive observation. Finally, the FAO program is still too embedded in legacy thinking. All FAOs are Regular Line Officers (RLO); generalists who are frequently obliged to progress through an ever-mobile career template enroute to higher responsibility and command. Despite their specialization in a particular country or region, too many RLO FAOs will not stay in place in a specific, narrowly-defined AO. As FAO qualified officers progress in rank and responsibility they will often move to regional or higher billets that cover wider areas of responsibility. There are currently no FAO Limited Duty Officers (LDO)/Warrant Officers that could provide years of continuous presence in a fixed and limited AO with a FAO charter. Virtually all Warrant Officers assigned to attaché duty (Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 350L) function as DAO operations officers, not as country/area specialists. Like many FAOs themselves, diplomatic Warrant Officers move frequently. The 350Ls usually don't even speak the language of their host nation posting. Moreover, despite the superlative capabilities of 350Ls to do their traditional functions on DAO staffs, the requirements for continuous global engagement in remote, often hostile, areas requires a LDO/WO with a warrior-first ethos (such as 180As or 18-series NCOs); just expanding the number of 350Ls will not suffice for the GEP. Some FAOs come from the combat arms and some do not. Very few 350Ls are accessed from the combat arms. Those FAOs/350Ls who come from the combat arms may reasonably be expected to have a warrior ethos suitable for expanded duties in remote environments. The presence of such an ethos should not, however, be expected to be universally -- or even generally -- true. In sum, select FAOs are the nearest manifestation of the diplomat-warrior permanently resident in America's embassies, but they are not intended, nor are they sufficient -- even in greater numbers -- to provide continuous, intimate observation and reporting of local foreign micro-environments.

In addition to the DAO, and its constituent staff permanently resident in a foreign country, some foreign missions contain Security Assistance and other advisory functions distinct from the DAO. These range from single individuals to expansively staffed and outfitted Joint United States Military Advisory Groups (JUSMAG). Security Assistance Officers (SAO), whether operating alone or as part of a multi-person office, assist the host nation with the transfer of security assistance funds and material provided by the United States as a component of bilateral agreements. The senior SAO functions as the Theater Commander's point man in-country and is responsible for executing that country's portion of the (military) Theater Engagement Plan. This Theater Engagement Plan is a military-referenced initiative rather than a program of inductive observation. Although SAO are obliged to develop and maintain an expertise in the status and requirements of the host nation military, they are focused on the host military as an organization and not tasked to maintain detailed and continuous knowledge of remote local environments. The SAO will work within the established framework of embassy policy regarding U.S.-Host Nation bilateral agreements for assisting the host nation's security. The SAO is not in country to observe conditions of human micro-environments per se, but only to understand them well enough to perceive what assistance the host government requires. Practically speaking, SAO are largely focused on equipment purchases and transfers, and where they operate without a JUSMAG, in facilitating training assistance visits by TDY personnel. Many SAO frequently travel to remote regions in the host country and accumulate insight into the host nation's general security concerns. Such travel however is temporary, and SAO are thus unsuited to continuous presence and observation of micro-environments. Many important countries with strong U.S.-Host Nation bilateral relations and a tradition of close military cooperation have a JUSMAG. These organizations exist primarily to coordinate, manage, and support American military operations, and other operations with military components, that occur continuously (such as U.S. military support to Humanitarian De-mining efforts or the retrieval of American remains from past conflicts such as the Joint Task Force Full Accounting). JUSMAGs are also preoccupied with support for military exercises that include participation by American personnel and occur with regular frequency, such as the big Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)-directed training exercises and the Joint and Combined

Exercises for Training (JCET). Like SAO, JUSMAG staffs often travel widely throughout the host nation country and accumulate considerable insight into the overall host nation conditions. Like the SAO, their primary efforts are focused on the operational requirements of supporting current and pending operations, not on continuous presence in, focus on, and reporting about local foreign conditions in remote regions. Moreover, like the embassy and most other official American presence in the host nation, JUSMAG personnel are primarily based in the capitol, far away from the remote regions and their human environments. The TDY personnel that JUSMAG supports and occasionally accompanies do sometimes go into remote regions, but the JUSMAG presence in those remote regions is fleeting. Military TDY operations themselves will be addressed below.

B. ECONOMIC & FINANCIAL

Some may argue that American economic and financial efforts are already coordinated by the embassy, and the embassy already maintains visibility of the myriad efforts by (non-U.S. Government) host nation and international assistance organizations and aid programs, non-governmental organizations (NGO), volunteer organizations (VO), and private companies, etc. This is partially true, but it suffers from the same limitations as discussed with the diplomatic instrument. The focus of the embassy remains primarily on the host nation foreign government – in this regard host nation economic development objectives and efforts and financial inputs – and is thus seen primarily through the lens of the host nation government. The same operational constraints apply to monitoring of relatively remote and neglected areas' economic development and financial status as all other fields of official American endeavor. Although the economic and agricultural sections in some American embassies are quite robust and make concerted efforts to assist the host foreign nation, the majority of these efforts are pursued through the organization and mechanisms of the host nation. Like other fields of embassy endeavor, areas of current economic and financial interest can receive massive attention and inputs—to include temporary dispatching of economic and financial FSO to remote areas – but such efforts are of limited duration. Once an effort has concluded, the American participants withdraw to the embassy or consulate, and rely primarily on indirect monitoring of the effort's effects through host nation government

channels and host nation co-operatives. Moreover, while the economic and financial trends may be monitored, they are likely to be uncoordinated with the other instruments of American power and lack integration into a comprehensive GEP.

C. INFORMATIONAL

Many commentators since September 11th have argued that America does not have, or has not used, sufficient means of engaging the world with “soft power.” This is generally understood as waging and winning the “war of ideas” through efforts to inform and persuade foreign audiences. Carnes Lord has recently asserted that American soft power is “broken,” has outlined what it is and why it is important, and has made recommendations on how to fix it. Lord asserts that soft power is “the key to winning the GWOT because it is the key to legitimizing U.S. global primacy and highlights America's efforts to promote global democracy.”¹³ After several years of “benign neglect” of soft power by the American government, the new Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has testified before Congress in 2005 that the emphasis on soft power is now a “priority.”¹⁴ Nevertheless, Lord explains that soft power is difficult for several reasons: (1) its influence is pervasive, but the exact meaning of what it is, how it is employed, and who should do it is elusive; (2) there is both domestic and foreign cultural resistance to it; (3) the mission and roles of who does it remains unclear as it cuts across several bureaucratic boundaries with no one clearly in charge of a comprehensive policy for formulation and action; and there is no clear terminology, doctrine, or trained cadres by which it can be conducted.¹⁵ Lord decries recent missteps such as the folding of the United States Information Agency (USIA) into the DOS, the largely ineffectual Radio Sawa and al Hoorah efforts, and the abortive Office of Strategic Influence in the DOD.¹⁶ Moreover, Lord distinguishes between propaganda, public affairs, and public diplomacy; further distinguishing the latter into its constituent parts of information, education and cultural

¹³ Lord, C. (2005, February 9). *American Soft Power: Why It's Broken And How To Fix It*. Lecture presented at the Naval Postgraduate School. Monterey, CA.

¹⁴ Lord, C. (2005, February 9).

¹⁵ Lord, C. (2005, February 9).

¹⁶ Lord, C. (2005, February 9).

initiatives, and the narrow and specifically targeted “political actions.”¹⁷ Finally, Lord highlights his assertion that for public diplomacy, the minds of elites are the critical target in defeating radical Islam.¹⁸

This thesis does not challenge Dr. Lord’s outline except in the implications of his final emphasis. The remote and relatively underpowered non-elite human communities in the micro regions of foreign countries should be considered a legitimate target. Targets of DOS public diplomacy can be better engaged with such diplomacy to the extent that the American mission better understands the local foreign inhabitants’ true concerns. If one begins with the assumption that such remote communities are distinct environments removed from the elite corridors of official state power, then one would want to monitor developments in those distinct environments. It does marginal good to completely convince (or even co-opt) the elites of a Reza Pahlevi, a Marcos, or a Batista, if America cannot accurately gauge the more humble societies and potentially powerful currents in motion underneath and outside of state organs of power. Such remote human environments are capable of not only moving separately from official host nation policy, they are often able to initiate regime-threatening movements that are unmonitored until it is too late to react and intervene -- through host nation regime engagement -- to safeguard American interests. Lord, like most U.S. scholars and policy makers, understandably sees the efficient application of soft power through “public diplomacy” as legitimately structured within the DOS. This is both reasonable and efficient, and consistent with the American tradition of DOS ambassadors and embassies being the lead agents and agencies in foreign affairs. But if the widespread commentary about the challenges of globalization and the gradual erosion of the dominant state-to-state dynamic is correct, America requires a more diffused mechanism for observing and reporting the effects of such efforts, however they are eventually resolved and implemented. Moreover, the availability of such diffuse observers -- where permitted by the host nation -- would provide a quick, nearly direct, and honest appraisal of whatever effects such soft power

¹⁷ Lord, C. (2005, February 9).

¹⁸ Lord, C. (2005, February 9).

influence -- and other manifestations of American *Kulturkampf*¹⁹ -- trickle down and through to the foreign micro environment. Such permanent observing and reporting would enable the development and fine-tuning of the most relevant and effective campaign of public diplomacy in a continuous loop.

D. LAW ENFORCEMENT.

As has been noted by many commentators, the requirements of prosecuting counter-insurgency in Iraq, or similar efforts in other parts of the world in the 21st century, share many of the characteristics of efficient law enforcement.²⁰ It is important to make the distinction between the important and appropriate use of international and national law enforcers such as Interpol and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the cooperative effort to track down networks of Al Qaeda or drug cartels, and the more pedestrian local toil of the urban beat cop or the county sheriff. The former is a national asset using all technologies available to investigate known cases and apprehend identified or suspected opponents from the top down. Their efforts are characterized by a mission focused on specific individuals and identified threats from the inception, and through deliberate police and analytical methods developing an ever-expanding trail of information leading to the apprehension of the subjects of interest. The beat cop or sheriff, however, although occasionally tasked to participate in such deliberate efforts, is

¹⁹ Libicki, M. (1995). What Is Information Warfare? *Institute for National Strategic Studies ACIS Paper 3, Ch 6*, pp. 4-5. Libicki maintains that cultural conflict is ancient, and downplays the notion that culture war is a problem for the United States saying, "cultural warfare is something the United States is more likely to do to others." His position that "political culture... and trade rules aside, policy is completely and properly silent about other cultural influences," suggests that he does not see much utility in the cultural (information) warfare promise of public diplomacy.

²⁰ U.S. Government. (2003, February). *National Strategy For Combating Terrorism*. The *Strategy* discusses law enforcement as one of the essential instruments of national power. For example, "at every opportunity we will continue to enhance international counterterrorism cooperation through the further expansion and sharing of intelligence and law enforcement information." Verton, D. (2003). *Black Ice: The Invisible Threat Of Cyber-Terrorism*. New York: McGraw-Hill. p. 181. Verton quotes former CIA Director John Deutch as saying that "new threats like cyber-warfare have blurred the lines between law enforcement and national security issues." Buckley, D. & Meese, M. (2003). The financial front in the global war on terrorism In R. Howard & R. Sawyer (Eds.), R. (2004) *Defeating Terrorism: Shaping The New Security Strategy*. Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill. pp. 51-61. "Judicious enforcement of criminal statutes that are typically associated with white-collar and organized crime can be an especially effective tactic against terrorists and their financial supporters."

essentially a surveyor and responder to that which is incongruent in their jurisdiction.²¹ The beat cop or sheriff is of the environment in which he works. He becomes intimately familiar with both his environment, through continuous presence and long habituation, and how the people in his area live and behave. The first warning of growing, broad-based turmoil which will lead to latent riot conditions in South Central Los Angeles for example, is more likely to come from the cop who works there on the streets and in close contact with the population, year upon year, than from the mayor, police commissioner, or urban criminologists at UCLA. The county sheriff of some remote area in Minnesota or Mississippi will likely be the first to spot the new dirt airfield with the suspicious night landings of small fixed-wing planes, or the recent influx of illegal aliens looking for work and leading to possible racial tensions, than either the local Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) or Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Service (CIS) offices in St. Paul or New Orleans. On occasion, the cop or sheriff is mobilized as part of a larger unit to conduct a specific and discrete mission or investigation. Most often, however, they are observing their jurisdiction for incongruent and unusual events and trends of interest and reporting them to higher echelons.

The same principle is in effect in monitoring developments in remote foreign environments for the impact they might have on American global interests. It is traditional under the modern understanding of nation-state sovereignty to strictly distinguish what are domestic internal affairs and what are foreign affairs. Domestic affairs such as the host nation's law enforcement are the prerogative and responsibility of the foreign host nation, the result of the host nation's historical development, customs, and judicial structure, and are properly handled by the host nation's internal law

²¹ Gladwell, M. (2002). *The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make A Big Difference*. New York: Back Bay Books. Discussing epidemics both literally and figuratively as developing social phenomena, Gladwell says "epidemics are sensitive to the conditions and circumstances of the times and places in which they occur (p. 139)." Gladwell's discussion of the 'Broken Windows Theory' and the 'Power of Context' provide insight into how observation of seemingly unimportant small matters foreshadow and provide insight into larger trends. "the criminal – far from being someone who acts for fundamental, intrinsic reasons and who lives in his own world – is actually someone acutely sensitive to his environment, who is alert to all kinds of cues, and who is prompted to commit crimes based on his perception of the world around him (p. 150)." If American observers can develop this sensitivity – sensitivity only possible by continuous presence in the environment – such observers should be able to report developing trends and recommend strategies for addressing them. Jones, R.V. (1975). The theory of practical joking: An elaboration. In B. Whaley (Ed.), *An Intelligence Reader* (2nd ed.). Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School. pp. 187-202. Jones discusses the role of spotting incongruities in leaps of scientific insight and explicitly points out the parallel with intelligence observation and analysis.

enforcement apparatus. One does not argue that America has a responsibility or need to follow (or even be aware of) the latest whodunit or he said/she said domestic event. Coverage of such a degree is not only impossible and irrelevant, it is absurd. There are, however, useful insights to be gained by seeing American global engagement from the perspective of the beat cop or sheriff. A local murder or case of arson (or a rapid series of such events) in the environs of Manado, on the Indonesian island of Sulawesi, or along the Amu Darya river in northern Uzbekistan, is of no particular interest or import to American policy makers. If a local American “sheriff,” through continuous presence in, and intimate familiarity with, his “jurisdiction” notices that the series of victims happen to be the Indonesian Christian community leaders in the area, or Uzbek security personnel, however, this information may be indicative of larger and more important trends with direct relevance to American interests. Such well-placed and permanent American “sheriffs” -- where permitted as augmentees to an established American embassy staff -- in remote foreign environments could provide such reports as part of an American strategy for global engagement.

The obvious and immediate objection to this observation would come from the DOS and the intelligence communities. They would claim to have direct observation, direct reporting, and/or indirect reporting through host nation counterparts. Direct observation is extremely unlikely, however, unless it happens to coincide with another ongoing effort, or the American mission had previously been alerted to the event. Unless it was a lucky coincidence that American operatives were in the area already, America's embassies and intelligence agencies simply don't have the manpower to cover all of these remote areas and conduct their other priority missions at the same time. If they had direct reporting from an established chain of information-providing host nation co-operatives, this raises the difficulties, risks, and expense associated with the maintenance of such a chain. Chief amongst these drawbacks are the reliability and timeliness of such reports. Moreover, such chains themselves are limited and the efficient use of such co-operatives is therefore usually focused on more discrete and specific missions. Nor should it be acceptable to assert that once an event or series of events has captured the interest of the embassy or intelligence agency that an American observer or host nation co-operative can be dispatched on a discrete errand to inquire about conditions. The time lag and

necessarily temporary duration of such a dispatch will ensure that the American picture of remote, foreign events begins and will likely remain reactive. In fact, the overwhelming majority of such law enforcement reports that come to the attention of the embassy and intelligence agencies are received indirectly. The American officers are informed by their host nation counterparts (after host nation vetting and editing), or the information is culled from reports in the host nation press or by indigenous community word-of-mouth contacts. Such reports, and the picture pieced together from such disjointed sources, may be inaccurate, incomplete, and self-serving, and will certainly be time-delayed and inefficiently composed. It would be much preferable to American national information gathering to have a direct report from the local American “sheriff” who lives in and intimately understands his “jurisdiction.” How many “sheriffs” does American currently have in Sulawesi or on the Amu Darya?

E. INTELLIGENCE.

As of mid-2005, critiques of American intelligence are widespread and everyday occurrences. In the years since September 11th 2001, it has become banal to decry America’s debilitated Human Intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities and to call for reform. Such shortfalls as were identified by Congress’s 9/11 Commission and other investigations of intelligence inadequacies have spurred numerous, imaginative initiatives. Among these initiatives are: (1) reorganization of America’s intelligence structure to a greater or lesser extent; (2) the creation of a national intelligence director (which has occurred); (3) DOD attempts at aggregation of more intelligence assets and roles from other agencies; (4) more money; (5) expanded authorities; (5) more intelligence units; (6) new skills and functions for old units; (7) new units; and (8) new concepts such as the Strategic Support Branch (SSB) initiative among others.²² Unfortunately, a detailed discussion of these initiatives and their operative employment is beyond the scope of this thesis, given its conceptual and unclassified nature. As a consequence, the discussion below will refer only to open source information. Although this thesis remains an unclassified examination, it is possible to generalize the essential

²² Gellman, B. (2005, January 23). Secret Unit Expands Rumsfeld’s Domain. *Washington Post*. Retrieved May 13, 2005 from <http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/terrorwar/analysis/2005/0123ssb.htm>.

assumptions of different means for gathering intelligence, each method's promise and particular excellence, and each method's weaknesses in prosecuting an American global engagement plan.

Before discussing intelligence, however, it is essential to briefly review the overarching concepts of this thesis to put its implications into sharp contrast with the current American intelligence structure and the promise of new structures and initiatives. The envisioned operatives of the proposed American GEP, are not intelligence agents per se, are not spies, do not steal other peoples' secrets, and conduct only the type of open-source "intelligence" operations consistent with those routinely expected of other DOS officials: GEP operatives would be overt (albeit discreet) observers and reporters of open source information noticed by well-prepared, mature, and seasoned (ideally military) minds. As civilian professionals in an overt role, Title 10, 11, and 50 legal issues would be similar to those pertaining to DOS personnel. Where allowed by (explicit or tacit) bilateral agreements between the host nation and the American embassy, GEP operatives would be allowed the same latitude -- or suffer the same restrictions -- as other DOS officials. The reader should remember this contrast between the essential, important, and traditional role of espionage and the agencies that conduct it, with the explicitly-maintained DOS role of GEP operatives.

America has 15 separate and different intelligence agencies: the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); the FBI; the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); Army, Naval, Marine Corps, Air Force and Coast Guard Intelligence; the National Security Agency (NSA); the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO); the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGIA); the Energy Department Office of Intelligence; the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR); the Treasury Department Office of Intelligence Support; and the newly-created Homeland Security Department Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Office. These agencies can gather information using any one of the traditional functional techniques (HUMINT, ELINT, SIGINT, MASINT, IMINT, etc.). Each of these agencies, and the techniques for which they have solidified reputations, reached the height of their legacy development during World War Two and the Cold War era. Each became defined primarily by their roles in preparing for and conducting war against America's peer nation-state opponents. While

peer or near-peer nation-state threats remain the most potentially dangerous to American national survival, such major war threats are unlikely. Moreover, the legacy intelligence organizations remain equal to the task of preparing for and prosecuting war against major potential opponents; that is what they were designed for and are institutionally structured to do best. America's satellites can still look down on known structures such as missile silos, mass military formations, installations, visible networks, and cities. They can even focus in on tiny spaces if and when they have been given the priority and authority to do so. America's current ability to capture images is enhanced further by a range of air-breathing platforms from upper altitude SR-71s to ground-hugging pilotless drones. America's ability to capture, collect and analyze signals and emissions in multiple formats still leads the world. The military services are expert in their primary air, land, and sea dominance roles, and have the ability to collect, analyze and interpret the abilities and intentions of their mirrored forces in potentially opposing nation-states. American diplomats continue to conduct their traditional role of understanding and interpreting foreign nation-state government's policies and intentions, and the underlying general trends of the foreign host nation's society in which they are posted. Most of these DOD and DOS activities have a HUMINT component that contributes to their other methods of intelligence gathering, but are likewise limited by resources and the priorities derived from their primary organizational objectives. The agency traditionally charged above all others with HUMINT has been the CIA. Through direct access to the President, the CIA can be charged with undertaking intelligence and covert direct action operations that are directly responsive to the President and can be used surgically to fill high-level gaps in the intelligence picture or undertake sensitive actions to discretely influence international events.²³ If properly and consistently placed for observation, GEP operatives could gather much useful information that is readily available through open-source observation and reporting -- thus freeing the other intelligence agencies for more pressing activities.

²³ Zegart, A. (1999). *Flawed By Design: The Evolution Of The CIA, JCS, And NSC*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Zegart has shown how the two main functional components of the CIA, the Directorate of Operations (DCO) and the Directorate of Intelligence (DCI) have not evolved evenly. "The [DCO] covert wing... arose and flourished because presidents wanted it to.... At the same time, the CIA's [DCI] analysis and coordination efforts... have floundered (p. 186)." The exuberant enthusiasm for James Bond-like activities appears enduring in both the official and popular mind, while the many critiques of America's inadequate HUMINT capabilities are partially explained in Zegart's discussion of organizational competition and atrophy.

It is increasingly commonplace to appreciate that global conditions have changed and will be a continuing challenge in the 21st century. Efforts to restructure and refocus American defense and intelligence agencies are ongoing, and public and academic discussion increasingly exhorts the government to focus on the non-state and asymmetric threat of “4th Generation Warfare.” The prevailing assumptions in government of what change is required, however, are not necessarily correct or sufficient. It is widely appreciated that an overhead image cannot see through rooftops, and therefore overhead observation has its limitations. Order of battle intelligence remains essentially the same as it always has been (albeit enhanced by high technology); an attempt to gauge the permutations of all possible combinations of the friendly and enemy correlation of forces. The military’s mainstream intelligence emphasis on order of battle is limited (and always will be) by the intangibles of human intent and political motive. The FBI’s domestic functions, and the CIA and DOS’s foreign functions, are America’s primary providers of that elusive human material. The foreign intelligence operations of the DOS, however, are limited by their small number of personnel and their primary requirement to monitor the postures, power, and intents of foreign elites. Although its overseas role has expanded in recent years, the FBI is likewise limited because its foreign role is primarily engaged in specific and focused investigations, rather than intelligence operations per se. As Zegart has shown, the CIA’s HUMINT activities have languished under the institutional weaknesses, congressionally-mandated constraints, and the vicissitudes of public and presidential attitude.²⁴ If one assumes that the CIA is given broader authority, more resources, and a more aggressive mandate from senior decision-makers, will that necessarily solve America’s HUMINT deficiencies? It would be reasonable to expect that an expanded and emboldened CIA would boldly do more of what it has traditionally done. Although necessary, enhanced efforts to penetrate hostile networks of declared or potential opponents – projects that take years of highly intensive, expensive, and risky effort for uncertain results – will be many years in coming. The increased interconnectedness of the modern world, and American comparative advantages in high technology, increase the appeal of finding a high-tech solution to intelligence problems. The advances in high technology and the increasingly interconnected world have made

²⁴ Zegart, A. (1999), pp. 185-222.

persons-of-interest increasingly vulnerable to spotting, tracking, exploitation, and neutralization. The more an elusive and shadowy network of ne'er-do-wells use the benefits of the modern world, the more vulnerable they become to being found. Provided there is political will to do so, anything found by American intelligence and reported in a timely manner can theoretically be killed. This faith in high technology should be exploited to the utmost, but it too has limitations. The task of finding is the true challenge, and assuming that high-technology solutions are sufficient to observe, let alone understand, the majority of the world's low-tech population is to assume a too rational and too elitist bias in favor of America's strengths. America should not get tunnel vision on the high-intensity and consuming efforts in Southwest Asia. Threats can come from unexpected quarters, unlikely opponents, and the unforeseen coalescing of discrete trends and interests. That is in the nature of asymmetric warfare. American intelligence requires a vision broader than Al Qaeda and the other usual suspects in the counter-terrorist GWOT intelligence challenge. If Al Qaeda becomes ineffective tomorrow, or if America expends its efforts combating it for decades, the threats to American security are much larger than Al Qaeda and terrorism. The current GWOT-driven change and structural upheaval of American intelligence agencies may or may not fulfill the need to identify and neutralize all of the threats to American security.

Nor do current efforts at reorganization and restructuring by Secretary Rumsfeld to accrue more power to the DOD necessarily promise a panacea solution. Several open-source efforts have received press and speculation, to include the SSB. Details of units such as these is both classified and beyond the scope of this thesis. The general method of employment, however, can be assumed to approach "CIA-like activities" on behalf of the DOD without the bureaucratic and inter-governmental political frictions of having to rely on the CIA to actually provide the fruits of such activities. Although the DOD already controls eighty percent of the intelligence budget,²⁵ such restructuring is an attempt to

²⁵ U.S. Government. (2004). *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report Of The National Commission On Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States* (authorized addition). New York: Norton. p. 86.

increase the mandate of the DOD's permissible activities into Title 50 responsibilities.²⁶ The political and organizational turf battles and the legal questions aside, it is reasonable to ask what the DOD would do with such an expanded mandate. If it conducts operations essentially as the CIA has done – relatively bureaucratic structure at home, small representation in foreign posts abroad, with a few operatives sent out beyond the wire on focused and discrete missions, it will suffer many of the same constraints the CIA does (and probably some new ones). If the intent is primarily to conduct “CIA-like activities” at the tactical level, this could prove to be the greatest improvement of battle area intelligence (if done well) since the wartime Office of Strategic Services provided tactical and operational intelligence to the Army in World War Two.²⁷ The World War Two example, however, was a conflict of nation-states with clearly defined sides and clearly marked boundaries. The 21st century is a kaleidoscope of change. Tactical exploitation of intelligence is fine if America is committed to a specific country for a declared purpose. Such tactical operatives can be employed as an adjunct to that specific and declared purpose. How will the new units engage the majority of the world outside of a few specific and declared national efforts, however? If the intent of any such new units and capabilities is strategic, how will they differ in ways from the CIA that would cover remote foreign human environments? Will the new DOD units with their CIA-like mandate be posted to foreign missions abroad? Will they operate primarily out of foreign capitols and major cities in countries where there is no specific and declared purpose for

²⁶ Gellman, B. (2005, January 23). "The secretary actually has more responsibility to collect intelligence for the national foreign intelligence program . . . than does the CIA director," Boykin said. "That's why you hear all this information being published about the secretary having 80 percent of the [intelligence] budget. Well, yeah, but he has 80 percent of the responsibility for collection, as well...." Pentagon officials emphasized their intention to remain accountable to Congress, but they also asserted that defense intelligence missions are subject to fewer legal constraints than Rumsfeld's predecessors believed. That assertion involves new interpretations of Title 10 of the U.S. Code, which governs the armed services, and Title 50, which governs, among other things, foreign intelligence.... Known by several names since its inception as Project Icon on April 25, 2002, the Strategic Support Branch is an arm of the DIA's nine-year-old Defense Human Intelligence Service, which until now has concentrated on managing military attachés assigned openly to U.S. embassies around the world." Prados, J. (2005, March). Pentagon power play: Turf wars and bad analysis are just two likely products of the disastrous new intelligence reform. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. Retrieved May 14, 2005 from [http:// www.thebulletin.org / article.php?artofn+ma05prados](http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?artofn+ma05prados)

²⁷ O'Donnell, P. (2004). *Operatives, Spies, And Saboteurs: The Unknown Story Of The Men And Women Of WW Two's OSS*. New York: Free Press. The World War Two OSS, and by extension, modern day special operations forces and paramilitary units, have grand strategic, strategic, operational, and tactical utility. Although O'Donnell does not make a case for grand strategic utility of such units, his numerous historical vignettes offer examples of their utility at the three lowest levels of scale.

such American activity? It may prove awkward and redundant to have such units operating from the traditional centers of the DOS and other agencies, and it would likely suffer the exact same limitations that characterize those agencies' unsuitability for monitoring remote, foreign, and human micro-environments.

Even an expanded CIA, and an expanded DOD engaged in "CIA-like activities" traditionally conceived, would leave a majority of the world's area and inhabitants virtually unengaged. America's security and interests in the 21st century may indeed require more "intelligence," but it certainly requires more "information." Too often intelligence is conceived of as only stealing secrets and conducting covert operations. The requirement to steal and act surreptitiously will always be there, but most of the "intelligence" America has lacked and continues to underemphasize is merely information. A majority of this information does not require stealing, it requires observing. It does not necessitate risky and desperate operations with sex appeal and cachet, as much as continuous and attentive monitoring by alert and perspicacious observers.

F. MILITARY

There are various ways to define engagement. For the purposes of this thesis, military "engagement" can be understood to fall into four broad categories: the use of military force as combat power, all activities preparatory to military force used as combat power, post-combat activities, and peacetime engagement. To understand military engagement, it is important to recognize what is central to the military purpose as traditionally conceived – what is its particular excellence – and what lies outside of that central purpose.

Clausewitz said that war is intended to compel the enemy to do one's will.²⁸ In military terms, offensive military power is the essential force necessary to actively achieve that result, and all other activities are supportive adjuncts to that central purpose. The three primary services (Army, Navy, and Air Force) are functionally designed to provide that compelling force on/in the land, sea, and air respectively, and the ability to conduct combat in those domains is their *raison d'être*. The primary services only have

²⁸ Clausewitz, C. (1968). *On War*. New York: Penguin. p. 101

functional meaning if they are able to maintain those abilities. A 10 million man Army would be the world's largest, but if it consisted of only administrators, cooks, truck drivers, and other personnel with support functions, the Army would not be able to achieve and maintain its requirement to dominate opponents on land. Likewise, the particular excellence of the Navy is to provide the ability to compel one's opponents at sea, and the Air Force must be able to do the same in the air. All other elements of these services are supportive of the essential elements able to provide this compelling force, and thus outside of the services' main focus.²⁹

Although rudimentary to the understanding of military art and science, one must distinguish between these elements that are able to take the offense from those that are merely defensive. Fortifications, naval minefields and anti-aircraft fire may all prevent the enemy from achieving his goals, but this is not compelling him to do one's will. Rather it is preventing him from compelling one to do his. The Department of "Defense" in this light is a misnomer because America, as a great power, has always sought to advance its interests in the world, rather than merely ward off the blows of aggressors. Even a newly formed and weak American nation preoccupied with defense in the early 19th century found it necessary to take the battle to the enemy against the Barbary pirates. For any nation state that would actively advance its own interests against armed opposition and with abilities under its own control, "defense" inherently requires the ability to conduct offense. The greater the nation state and the greater its intention to advance great interests, the more offensive capability will be required. The leaders of the huge service bureaucracies and millions of personnel that are charged with maintaining America's military instrument of national power understand this requirement. They know that the ability to conduct offense is a more demanding requirement than merely crouching behind palisades (high-technology or otherwise) and waiting. All other considerations are theoretically subordinate to this driving organizational imperative. Adherence to the offensive imperative creates an organizational mindset in the

²⁹ What these essential compelling elements are has varied throughout history. On land the chariot, phalanx, legion, cavalry, cannon, tank, etc., all claimed the dominant role of providing the ability to dominate the combat conventions in their eras. At sea, the trireme, man o' war, steam ship, aircraft carrier or submarine have all provided the compelling power for navies, and fighters, bombers, and missiles have served a similar function in the air. Although the technologies change, and different technologies are appropriate to different domains, they all share a common quality: they are able to go to the enemy and compel him to submit.

mainstream services that Rothstein characterizes as “a kind of DNA”³⁰ which can’t fundamentally be altered. Efforts to transform parts of these services that fall outside of this archetypal DNA are generally rejected, quarantined, and the pressures to eventually return them to the original type are virtually insurmountable.

Although both understandable and appropriate to maintaining the services’ particular excellence, such a mindset has several implications. America’s commitments span the globe, and the services must be correspondingly large. Despite the current efforts to transform the military from a legacy Cold War force to a more modular, streamlined, and flexible instrument, the service organizations remain big.³¹ Whether the majority of Army land power is massed on the plains of central Europe, the Korean peninsula, and a few magnet bases in the Continental United States (CONUS), or whether it is widely dispersed in smaller brigade-sized elements, the Army remains big. The same is even truer for a Navy and Air Force which have global responsibilities, a technological imperative to remain cutting edge, and long lead times for offensive platform hardware. Bigness is manifested in a never-declining number of generals and admirals, an enormous bureaucracy, and an equally enormous budget. As Allison & Zelikow and Zegart have argued, huge organizations move under their own impetus, jealous of their mandates and prerogatives, and are tenacious in defending anything that appears to threaten them.³² The assumption that bigness is a virtue permeates mainstream service thinking. Rare is the general/admiral who doesn’t viscerally believe that wars are won by big battalions,

³⁰ Rothstein, H. (2004, November). Lecture presented at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.

³¹ Conetta, C. (2003, February 6). *Project On Defense Alternatives*. Retrieved May 13 2005 from <http://www.comw.org/pda/0302conetta.html>. "If September 11 teaches anything, it teaches that spending large sums on defense cannot itself guarantee security. Nonetheless, the September 11 attacks prompted a steep increase in the Pentagon budget. In 2003, the Pentagon will spend \$83 billion more than it did in 1998 -- a 28 percent increase, after inflation.... It has become commonplace to say that the "world changed" fundamentally on 11 September 2001, when terrorists attacked the Pentagon and World Trade Center. Actually, it had changed 12 years earlier -- in 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell and the Cold War order began to crumble worldwide. With this, the types of threats that had shaped the US military since World War II began a precipitous decline -- and a different set of challenges rose to prominence. What preceded the 11 September attack was a decade-long failure to adapt the US military to new conditions. And the failure continues still.... While the world changed rapidly and radically after 1990, America's armed forces did not -- apart from reducing in size. Rather than refashion its tool box to fit new conditions, the Pentagon mainstream has tended to view the new era in terms of the types of tools it had on hand at the Cold War's end. This, notwithstanding the fact that "transformation" has been a Pentagon watchword since the mid-1990s."

³² Allison, G. & Zelikow, P. (1999), pp. 143-160; Zegart, A. (1999), pp. 223-236.

carrier battle groups, and fighting wings. “Smallness” is therefore suspect because it connotes an insufficiency of means, a supportive and subordinate effort, lack of strategic utility, and an inability to force a decision.³³

The ability to force the decision is also a central assumption in the thinking of the big mainstream military. Wars of attrition, position, and maneuver have constituted the overwhelming majority of military actions throughout history, but the services must be designed to defeat the biggest and most dire threats to national survival conceivable in wars of annihilation. A world war with peer or near-peer opponents is the driving impetus of how the services are modeled. While waiting for such rare conflagrations to materialize, the majority of conflicts of lesser scale and/or of the attrition, position, and maneuver type are addressed with elements detached from the world war winning model force. The decisiveness assumption still permeates smaller scale conflicts - such as the invasion of Panama that deposed Noriega, or the liberation of Kuwait - and anything perceived as being unable to force a decision is regarded as apart from the proper template of mainstream military activity.

There are hundreds of non-decisive military actions in the modern world to be sure, but these are all seen as something apart from the mainstream military’s reason for existence. Small scale contingency operations such as temporarily introducing security elements into a conflict area, observer forces, humanitarian assistance, training of allies, etc, are all considered collateral activities. Many of these activities are lumped under the rubric of ‘nation building,’ and from the mainstream military perspective it is small wonder that they are seen as open-ended, indecisive, wasteful of finite assets, and outside of their proper mainstream focus. It is not difficult to understand how much less desirable the service would regard the concept of engaging foreign peoples in remote localities (and away from anything traditionally identified as a legitimately decisive target) for the sake of engagement itself. Moreover, as Van Crevald has outlined in *The Transformation of War* -- and despite all of the contemporary hoopla over transformation -- the military remains fixed in Clausewitz’s trinitarian warfare. War is between states which give purpose and sanction to war, those wars are fought by state militaries against each other, and the people – although providing the foundation upon which both states and militaries

³³ Campbell, J. (1988, Spring). Once Burned, Twice Cautious: Explaining The Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, *Armed Forces Journal*, Spring 1988. pp. 357-374.

rest – are a separate and distinct element from war proper.³⁴ Most 20th century wars and conflicts in which America did or might have engaged in were judged by this convention; a convention that discounts the human environment or regards humans as a nuisance that gets in the way on the battlefield. If one cannot fundamentally accept the idea that most wars of the recent past were, and virtually all future wars will be, fought in and for the human environment itself, one will continue to undervalue continuous presence and engagement. To hold the high ground and strike the opponent's center of gravity have been resilient guidelines in conducting war. In the past, high ground was dirt and the center of gravity was some mass or node of state power to be seized, destroyed, or neutralized by hard power. In the future, the "high ground" or "center of gravity" for "war" -- or the many states of conflict and competition that fall short of war -- is people. Addressing the issues of people effectively with soft power must be predicated on the understanding through observation that the military too often eschews or de-emphasizes in its preference to wield hard power.

Once one agrees that the mainstream military perceives itself as essentially a big offensive organization, designed to achieve decisive results for and against primarily state opponents using templated structures and procedures, it becomes easy to see the military's primary view of engagement before and after decisive operations. The primary military rationale for engagement prior to the introduction of combat forces focuses on the operational requirements of those forces themselves. The military develops its understanding of and relationships with an environment to facilitate its own templated plans. Understanding is limited by a rationality bounded by a mission spin-up cycle of interest (where American forces enter an area of operations (AO) from the outside and for specific limited objectives), and satisfied to a greater or lesser degree by time pressures. The intelligence developed for any given military mission is typically condensed and limited to only those factors, players, and events that appear germane to a given situation,

³⁴ Van Crevald, M. (1991). *The Transformation Of War: The Most Radical Reinterpretation Of Armed Conflict Since Clausewitz*. New York: Simon and Schuster. p. 34. "Among military theorists, Clausewitz stands alone. With the possible exception of the ancient Chinese writer Sun Tzu, no other author has ever been as remotely influential, and indeed to this day his work forms the cornerstone of modern strategic thought. His continuing relevance is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that he is one of the few military thinkers to whom homage is paid on both sides of what, until recently, used to be the Iron Curtain." The assumption on the part of the Bush administration that military victory in Iraq would signal final victory is a manifestation of Clausewitzian influence.

and could affect the unit, its area of responsibility (AOR), and its current mission. The military intelligence agencies will devote a majority of their efforts to answering the questions of the commander and filling the gaps of desired information pertinent to the given mission and correlation of forces. Unless military presence in the area is routine, the gathering and development of consistent and continuous information will be a responsibility left to other agencies; invariably the DOS and the CIA. Once any hostilities have ended and/or combat forces are withdrawn from the area, the lead responsibility for continuing engagement reverts to the DOS. Military intelligence activities, having been spun up for and through any military action in an intensive burst of sudden activity, usually spin down again as the military action is concluded and the instrument is withdrawn. Although the military has unique capabilities to insert into the most remote and backward areas of the world, and occasionally a large volume of high-resolution information is obtained, these insertions are almost always temporary and immediate-mission specific. Given the military's standard engagement progression cycle of spin-up/spin-down-and-abruptly-disappear, the mainstream military (and even most employment of the heralded Special Operations Forces) as traditionally employed is unsuited for conducting continuous observation and reporting of human environments in remote foreign areas.

The military not only conducts combat in war and during small-scale contingencies, it also prepares for combat and enhances American diplomacy through peacetime engagement. Some allies, such as the United Kingdom, Qatar, Japan, and Singapore, are engaged on a permanent basis due to the stationing of American troops/units and the central importance of these nations to America's regional and global defense plans. America's military engagement with these countries is virtually permanent and conducted through all of the instruments of American national power on a continuous basis at the elite state to state level. The engagement of some traditionally strong allies, such as Germany and South Korea, are of this type but are relatively on the decline due to changing 21st century mainstream military requirements. Other close allies, such as Thailand, and the Philippines, do not have permanently stationed American troops/units, but bilateral defense exercises are routine, and they therefore host sizeable JUSMAGs to facilitate these bilateral exercises. Such engagement is less continuous than the

permanent type and marked by the limitations discussed above. Other generally friendly and cooperative nations, such as Malaysia, India, Egypt, Turkey, and Columbia will occasionally host American troops on a temporary and case-by-case basis. Engagement in these countries is continuous primarily through the DOS and other non-military agencies. Some countries, like Indonesia and Pakistan, which had previously been in this category, are currently not eligible to host American forces even temporarily due to U.S. Congressional action or changing international conditions. Some countries, like Vietnam and Somalia, do not maintain close bilateral military relations, but will accept temporary American military assistance for specific – usually humanitarian – events. Even less military engagement is conducted with regimes that are openly suspicious of, or opposed to, American interests and policies, such as Burma, China, Syria, Algeria, Mexico, Venezuela, and Belarus. Finally, some countries are unequivocally closed to American military engagement. In places like North Korea, Cuba, and Iran, even typical DOS and other agency engagement activities are severely constrained or totally absent.

In the types of countries willing to host American military forces on at least a temporary and case-by-case basis – even if only for humanitarian assistance – the temporary (and limited) engagement results from one of three causes: political initiative by the American government when world conditions permit an opening, foreign government request for specific assistance with a specific problem, and/or through the Geographic Combatant Commanders' (GCC) Theater Engagement Plans (TEP). TEP are developed by the four-star flag officers responsible for American geographic command AOs to gain access to select countries, to show military manifestations of political support in coordination with American government political initiatives, to enhance interoperability with the selected nations, and to enhance American forces' military capabilities. TEP take the form of bilateral and multi-lateral senior-level conferences, participation in regional forums concerning defense and security issues, providing training to foreign officers in American venues and reciprocal training of Americans in foreign venues, the above-mentioned Security Assistance activities, and exercises in foreign countries and waters. In some countries, such as the Philippines, Turkey, and Norway, all of these activities take place routinely. In most other, at least partly accessible countries, varying combinations of these engagements occur but in a

disjointed, discontinuous manner. The level of engagement through TEPs does not however provide a continuous presence, observation, and reporting of local foreign conditions. There are several reasons for this.

Major bilateral or multilateral military exercises, whether routine like Cobra Gold in Thailand or ad hoc such as the multinational naval interdiction exercise off the coast of Japan,³⁵ are focused primarily on big unit joint and combined interoperability, political accommodations, and the demonstration of bilateral or multilateral state-to-state comity. An exercise like Cobra Gold may well include deliberate close contact between American military forces and the host nation population through humanitarian assistance, medical, and engineering civil affairs activities. These activities are focused primarily on the ability of the American units to successfully complete their missions in unfamiliar surroundings and demonstrate interoperability with host nation forces. Although the local foreign populations who receive the benefits of such activities are likely to be grateful for any material improvement, and are often well-disposed to their temporary American visitors, these people are, strictly speaking, “the object of the exercise.” Lasting observation, understanding, reporting, follow-up, and maintained engagement with the local foreign environment and its populations are extremely rare (and when maintained, usually done by individual initiative outside the requirements of duty). Therefore, these big routine exercises, whatever they temporarily achieve in terms of understanding local environments and persuading local populations to be more disposed to Americans and America’s interests in the limited short run, are marginally effective for maintaining permanent and intimate observation, reporting, and influence on those populations. Such big exercise “engagement” is driven by state-to-state political and templated big-military interoperability concerns, abstracted-out of any deliberate and purposeful long-term global and regional engagement plan, and its local political effects are temporary and evanescent.

³⁵ Cobra Gold 2005 Combined Information Bureau (CIB). (2005, April 30). Retrieved May 14, 2005 from <http://www.apan-info.net/cobragold>. "Cobra Gold is a regularly scheduled military exercise designed to improve U.S., Thai, Singaporean and Japanese readiness and combined-joint interoperability, as well as enhance relationships and demonstrate participants resolve to support the humanitarian interests of friends and allies in the Asia-Pacific region."

Nor do the frequently conducted JCET programs deliberately and purposefully maintain whatever temporary rapport is built between American individual participants and the local populace. Special Operations Forces (SOF) - especially the Army Special Forces (SF), Civil Affairs (CA), and Psychological Operations (PSYOP), and to a lesser extent Navy Sea, Air, Land, Teams (SEALs) and other SOF - routinely conducted JCETs in their assigned theaters prior to September 11, 2001. Such JCETs are typically of one or two month's duration and involve small numbers of these elite personnel deploying into foreign host nations to deliver and receive training from their host nation counterparts. In virtually all cases, the teams deploy to the host nation from CONUS or a third country, and for only temporary periods. Proficient teams study the AO they will deploy into in greater detail and with much finer resolution than their mainstream service counterparts. The human environment is studied as a matter of threat identification and to establish methods of building rapport with their military counterparts and the local populace. All members of SF are required to have some familiarity with the languages pertinent to the AO. Moreover, through long experience and numerous exposures to many foreign nations and environments, individual veterans of SF can develop extraordinary expertise. Finally, SF personnel enjoy a reputation for toughness, independence, and resiliency in part due to their routine operations in remote, underdeveloped, and harsh environments; often amongst dangerous populations. All of these traits lead one to assume that American engagement of foreign human environments is adequate to continuous observation and reporting of changing conditions. This is very far from the truth.

Increased frequency of operations into an AO connotes operational capability to deploy into and work in the AO, and suggests familiarity with the AO's environment (human and otherwise). Both assumptions are more specious than is readily apparent. The common assumption is that the JCET component of TEPs builds a base of understanding and institutional knowledge for future use in potential contingencies. Note that this "base" is understood in terms of the frequency of JCET iterations conducted by higher echelon commands (battalions and above) that deploy the small detachments, units, and platforms into the foreign AO, and not necessarily the detachments themselves. Occasionally a small element may temporarily enjoy an intimate expertise of a foreign micro region that is temporarily unique and superior to any other in American

government experience. This expertise fades, however, as personnel turnover occurs and the latest in-country experience recedes further into history. In any case, such a “base” of understanding and operational familiarity is certainly not understood in terms of the local foreign environments and the foreign populations themselves (which are also in a constant state of flux). Although commands and units establish an organizational track record and reputation for familiarity with an AO, and with practice establish standard operational procedures (SOP) for conducting such activities, this “institutional knowledge” is not maintained by the inanimate organization. The people comprising the organization are where the true institutional knowledge resides. The tours of military personnel in any given unit are limited by both infrequency and finite duration of assignment to any given unit. As personnel turnover in any unit, many of these institutional insights and capabilities must be relearned. This is one reason why commands and units seek to repetitively conduct JCETs: the institutional knowledge and area expertise of the personnel currently manning any unit is perishable.

Beyond the assumption of expertise and the disruptions of personnel turnover, the JCET program is disjointed in grand design and inefficient in its particular execution. Which countries will be the venues for JCET deployments is determined in a haphazard and chaotic manner unsuitable to developing persistent and sophisticated expertise in any foreign environment. Which countries are engaged is a function of the GCC’s TEP priorities, American political and budgetary constraints of any given fiscal year, host nation willingness and interest in hosting such exercises, timing, executing unit availability, and other factors. What results from the yearly multi-lateral conferences and agreements for JCET planning is driven by ever-changing negotiations, current international political realities, and American governmental politics and organizational behavior. JCET planning does not proceed from a comprehensive and long-term national grand strategy for engagement.

There are only so many foreign nations willing and able to conduct JCETs with American forces. Foreign nations understandably seek to improve their security capabilities via JCET events and the negotiations to receive particular kinds of training constrain which units may participate in any given iteration. This rationally-driven goal of meeting the host nation’s preferences often runs counter to recurring deployment of

the same personnel to the same environment with deleterious effects on developing and maintaining American expertise. JCET opportunities are further limited by American self-imposed restrictions on the type of training that participating units may give and fine legal distinctions that require American forces to ostensibly benefit more from such training than the host nation does. Such self-imposed legalities are not conducive to maintaining consistent forward presence in foreign nations and continuous engagement with their populations. There is also only so much money, time, and so many units available to conduct JCETs as currently templated (receive the mission, pre-mission planning and training, deployment, employment, re-deploy, and recovery and reporting). Moreover, all units want to be part of the action and finite JCET opportunities are apportioned to the services' units without regard for an overarching plan to develop true expertise in the same environments by the same executing elements and personnel. For example, if "Country X" receives 15 JCETs in a year – and depending on that country's needs and requests – 5 may be apportioned to Air Force units, 5 may be apportioned to Navy units, and 5 to Army units. If all 5 units of each service belong to the same Air Force squadron, Naval Special Warfare Task Group, or Army Special Forces Group, this may seem to be a fair division of opportunities, but it makes little sense if the goal is development of routine and consistent expertise of a given country. The Air Force units will inherently train small cadres of host nation military personnel on predominantly technical skills. Although useful personal and professional relationships will be created, a majority of them will not be lasting and this does little if anything to develop micro-region understanding of the human environment. Navy SEAL Teams are by definition designed to conduct (and by extension train) naval tasks. Notwithstanding the benefits of such combined training and contacts, the same limitations as apply to Air Force engagement apply to the SEALs. In the conduct of their chartered training they are fixed on or near the coasts with small sized host nation counterpart units, or actually at sea where the human environment by definition does not predominantly exist. Moreover, the Air Force and SEALs do not have a charter to conduct unconventional warfare if such UW is defined as requiring intimate contact with foreign indigenous populations beyond their military counterparts. SF, which does have such a charter, is thus limited in the amount of coverage they can devote to any one country's population by the paucity of

opportunities to engage. Moreover, while from the perspective of the SF Group, five annual JCETs to Country X in a given year may sound like nearly continuous coverage, this is misleading. The opportunities for detachments to engage will likely be spread among the Group's constituent Battalions as a matter of managing work load and intra-organizational fairness. This spreads familiarization of the theater's countries among the sub units of a Group, but does little for developing and maintaining sophisticated expertise in a given foreign environment by an ever-improving sub unit of true experts.³⁶ The same misperception results at the GCC and theater command level. To the GCCs (all of whom are big mainstream service, conventional commanders), 15 successful JCET iterations in Country X are 15 iterations of successful military engagement. Whatever detailed and sophisticated understanding of the foreign environment derives from this "engagement" is a secondary and subordinate concern.³⁷

Nor is the typical perspective of the American country team in Country X in accord with a GEP. The DOS Country Team and its component agencies (even the military) assume that the present and traditional methods of DOS observation, assessment, and reporting of foreign conditions are already adequate to America's information and security needs. JCETs are seen at best as an opportunity to advance the Ambassador's plan to interact with the host nation government, and at worst as an opportunity for potentially dangerous and/or embarrassing events which may upset his plans, and which therefore must be carefully and conservatively constrained in execution. Such playing it safe as may then sometimes occur in the Ambassador's inclination to limit the movements of JCET units, is inconsistent with deploying those units where they best observe and report on areas of interest. The Ambassador, being the senior American official in the host country, may have legitimate reasons for constraining such activity, and may for safety or sheer political reasons, constrain where such teams go. This tactical

³⁶ There is admittedly a vital necessity that SF soldiers not be *too* constrained in their theater exposure. To maintain the high quality of SF soldiers they must -- over the course of a career -- be exposed to as many of the countries and areas of their home theater as possible.

³⁷ The reader should be careful to appreciate that this thesis does not argue for the elimination of JCETS for any of the services. JCETs are currently one of the best available tools for engagement with, and establishing familiarization of, foreign nations. JCETs should not go away! They should however be re-evaluated for the manner in, and the strategy by, which they are conducted. In the context of this thesis' definition of and focus on continuous engagement with foreign human micro-environments, JCETs as currently conducted are inefficient and too shallow compared with permanent, intimate, and continuous presence of SF in foreign environments.

control (TACON) over the location of employment venues is nevertheless inconsistent with a deliberate strategy for maintaining continuous observation of all areas in his/her country of responsibility.

Nor do any resident DAO or SAO officials, even if given the Ambassadorial latitude to do so, necessarily arrange the placement of JCET teams in areas about which even short duration information is desirable. The mandate of such military officials is to strengthen the relationship with the host nation military. The locations of JCET events are typically dictated by the host nation for their own security sensitivities or the requirements of their military development as addressed by bilateral agreement. Although it may be desirable to monitor every area of Country X – and any comprehensive engagement plan would require that venue selection should be driven by a supporting strategy – in fact, the venues selected will correspond instead to the co-location of host nation military units, host nation sensibilities, the DOS perception of in-country risk, and the political dictates of whatever administration happens to be in control in Washington. None of these practices aid in development of continuous and patient presence and expertise in, observation of, or reporting about conditions in remote foreign human environments as part of a strategic plan for global engagement.

Such expertise as any specific executing element may gain about the foreign environment is further limited by the short duration of actual time in-country and exacerbated still by the amount of time, money, and attention paid to merely going to and returning from the AO and the specific tasks to be accomplished during employment at the foreign site. Even assuming that the selected executing unit is well qualified to conduct the mission, a certain specific spin-up/spin-down-and-abruptly-disappear mission cycle obtains much as it does in the big mainstream services. Virtually all JCET missions arrive in the host nation from out-of-country. This requires international travel planning (with all that entails, to include the frequent hassles involved with transporting of hazardous cargo, weapons, and other controlled items) which takes up the majority of the higher and executing commanders' leadership focus. The majority of JCET expense is routinely devoured by three budgetary categories: transportation to and from home station, TDY per diem allowances, and TDY lodging costs, all of which could be largely eliminated by placing the units permanently overseas. Such permanent overseas basing

not only runs counter to current conventional wisdom,³⁸ -- and redeployment of large conventional units with huge signatures, logistical requirements, and expenses may, indeed, make sense in light of changing global strategy -- the fundamental rationale for permanent overseas presence of smaller and more flexible military forces -- such as SF -- demands a grand strategy for global engagement and an unequivocal understanding what such a strategy implies, how it can be done, and who should execute it. The goal of this thesis is to address these questions.

³⁸ Spencer, J. (2004, September 1). Before the Overseas Basing Commission, *The Heritage Foundation*. Retrieved May 14 2005 from [http:// www.heritage.org / Research / National Security / tst090104a.cfm](http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/tst090104a.cfm). "President George W. Bush announced on August 16, 2004, that the United States will alter its overseas basing infrastructure in the coming years. This realignment of forces could affect up to 70,000 servicemen currently stationed abroad and nearly as many dependants. The President should be applauded for this decision, which will advance America's national security. America's global basing infrastructure must be transformed for several reasons: 1 The current base structure was developed to defend against a largely static and predictable enemy—the Soviet Union—which no longer exists; 2. Today's threats—in stark contrast to those during the Cold War—are dynamic and unpredictable, and demand flexibility that is currently lacking; 3. A flexible basing structure will promote adaptability in a world of diverse political, strategic, and diplomatic interests; 4. America's commitment to regional stability can no longer be measured by manpower alone; 5. A more efficient global basing infrastructure will free manpower resources and help to alleviate personnel strains; 6. Evolving military technology allows the United States to apply greater amounts of military force over greater distances in shorter periods of time; and 7. Diversifying basing infrastructure throughout vital regions will allow the United States to surge capability to crisis areas."

III. IMPROVING U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES ENGAGEMENT IN A POSSIBLE PRACTICAL FUTURE (THE REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT CONCEPT), AND A GRAND (CIVILIAN) CONCEPTION FOR THE FUTURE (THE GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT PLAN).

From its official inception in 1952, U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) has been primarily perceived as a combat unit designed for the often murky concept of "unconventional warfare" (UW). Rooted in memories of its antecedent OSS in World War Two, various paramilitary and intelligence functions, and guerrilla warfare and counter-insurgency responsibilities have dominated the conventional conception of SF's unconventional utility. Since the end of the Cold War, the rationale for, and likelihood of, America prosecuting UW as originally conceived has dimmed. SF morphed into a provider of disjointed show-the-flag Foreign Internal Defense (FID) missions and an ever-expanding menu of dissipative collateral capabilities. Many SF commanders worried that SF had to strive for relevance to the Army and America in the Post-Cold War world. A growing emphasis on Direct Action (DA), commando-like capabilities seems to have emerged throughout the Special Operations community, threatening the promise of SF as a uniquely structured and strategic instrument for conducting continuous engagement in foreign Areas of Operation (AO). The current emphasis on DA attributes threatens to mask -- and overwhelm -- the potential of SF to play a much more appropriate and useful engagement function in the 21st century.

What follows is a detailed review and critique of a Regional Engagement Concept (REC) written in 1999 by Dr. Hy Rothstein (then an Army SF Colonel). This thesis is enthusiastic in its support of the REC; believing it articulates both the true promise of SF in continuous, long-term American engagement around the globe, and an evolutionary and limited -- and therefore prudent, practical, and eminently achievable -- concept. It is admittedly parochial to the needs of a military with responsibilities beyond "engagement" broadly-conceived. However, Rothstein has clearly made both the case that the REC (or a similar concept) is both useful in and of itself, and foreshadows themes that -- in the absence of an REC-like concept -- have currently come to haunt America in Iraq. One

recommends his concept be re-examined for the vision it held and continues to hold for America's future success in an uncertain world.

Nevertheless, and by comparison, this thesis asserts a vision that is grandiose in the extreme. The author is convinced that while Rothstein's concept is excellent as referenced to a military-centric perspective, a bolder, more comprehensive vision for the specific purpose of engagement for continuous observation and reporting is required. American security is ultimately guaranteed by the military -- a comprehensive total force without which America cannot survive. However, America does not and cannot live by military might, means, and perspective alone. Relying on a military-centric perspective obscures the promise of a wider effort herein coined as a "Global Engagement Plan" (GEP). Such a plan would view the world at a level of resolution beneath and apart from the traditional view of nation-states to focus on smaller components: community groupings herein termed "human micro-environments." Through a newly-created Global Engagement Agency (GEA) subordinate to the DOS, the entire world would be framed into GEP Areas of Operation (AO) aligned with ethnic, linguistic, religious, and other cultural and demographic realities insufficiently covered by traditional DOS observation and reporting. This would be the essential focus of a DOS GEP.

Like Rothstein's appreciation that continuous operations have a quality usually missed by the military's (and wider government's) tendency to focus on short-term, discrete problem solving, the GEP recommends that engagement should not be just *more* continuous, but be virtually permanent. Therefore a distinct and dedicated cadre of operatives would be required for lifetime employment in American global engagement activities. This cadre of GEA operatives would be civilians operating overtly; an elite collection of American DOS officials selected for, and permanently assigned to, specific areas for observation and reporting. Unlike the REC's vision of increased engagement, observation, and reporting by SF -- military assets who would continue to be employed where and when necessary, based on relatively short-term requirements and under military direction -- the civilian operatives of the GEA would be fixed for a career on a specific and fixed geographic AO under civilian direction. Successive generations of in-place GEA Operatives (GEOs) could provide an unprecedented level of observation and understanding that would not only improve civilian policy decisions, but would also

enhance military understanding and operational plans for specific military tasks as well. It is in this context then that the Rothstein REC will be examined as a likeminded inspiration and useful foil to the GEP.

A. A POSSIBLE PRACTICAL FUTURE: THE REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT CONCEPT

Rothstein begins by announcing the purpose of the REC; to provide "a coherent rationale... [and] a structured operational concept for executing regional engagement [--] the military's participation in the interagency activity of peacetime engagement."³⁹ Prudent, practical, and professional, Rothstein was interested only in a concept that could be operationalized; supporting the wider needs and extant structure of the military at the time it was written.

With a focus on the goal of transitioning from an idea to an accepted procedure, [I limit]... the concept of regional engagement to military activity....Practicality is the basis for limiting the concept to one of a military nature. While it is tempting to prescribe a concept for interagency and multinational operations, there simply is no mechanism for moving such a concept from an idea to an accepted procedure. This progression to accepted procedure is the difference between a concept that can drive future doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, and soldier selection and one that is nothing more than an interesting but somewhat sterile, intellectual exercise in "what could be." This [concept] pursues the former.⁴⁰

However, appreciating that engagement cannot be strictly a military activity, Rothstein hopes that such a concept will resonate outside the military. The GEP provides one possible solution to the lack of non-military engagement.

Successful implementation of the regional engagement may serve to influence the many other actors involved in peacetime engagement. It may lead them to develop and implement generally accepted procedures that will mirror (or at least support and complement) those of regional engagement as described.... Even if the interagency community fails to follow this lead, the concept will serve to enhance the ability of the

³⁹ Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. vi.

⁴⁰ Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. vi.

military to contribute to the overall U.S. peacetime engagement effort and to fight and win.⁴¹

As a serving senior officer and responsible academic, Rothstein took care to relate his expansive concept to specific civilian visions and issues relevant to current Army concerns.

An enduring requirement for peacetime engagement is derived from the emerging global strategic security environment and mandated in the NSS. Regional engagement represents a concept for military participation in the interagency activity of peacetime engagement. From a military perspective, regional engagement makes six important contributions to national security. These are avoiding war, informing policy makers, maintaining forward presence, facilitating decisive operations, facilitating conflict termination and securing the victory, and providing global economy of force.⁴²

And yet, regardless of civilian or military attitudes, the global environment itself recommended his study.

Today's global security environment is far more dynamic and complex than that which characterized the majority of the post-World War II period. While the threat presented by the former Soviet Union has dissipated, the world is anything but a safer place. A host of new threats and challenges has arisen. Ethnic and regional strife abounds. Increasing global interdependence, the advent of modern technologies, and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) all serve to elevate what once were items of relatively minor concern to issues with significant national security implications for the United States. As security concerns are increasing, opportunities to advance U.S. interests are also expanding. Trends toward greater democratization and expanding free markets are prevalent globally. The resulting interdependence, while increasing vulnerabilities, also serves to foster cooperation and provides diverse peoples and nations with common interests.⁴³

Rothstein wrote the concept in 1999 and based it on the vision and authority of the *1998 National Security Strategy*.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, the reader should not assume that

⁴¹ Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. vi.

⁴² Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 12.

⁴³ Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 1.

⁴⁴ *A National Security Strategy for a New Century (NSS)*, The White House, October 1998, as quoted in Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 1.

the rationale for the REP is therefore somehow outdated; the intent and vision are still very much relevant today.

The goal of this strategy is more ambitious than merely defending against imminent or actual threats to our vital national interests. Instead, it prescribes a proactive approach to national security policy stipulating that “We seek to *create* a stable, peaceful international environment...”⁴⁵ [*original italics*]. This approach responds to the need to enhance our security through more innovative, effective, and integrated actions that allow the U.S. to shape the international environment through engagement. The “imperative of engagement” resonates loudly throughout the NSS. Recognizing that neither the imperative of engagement nor the national security are the sole responsibility of the military, the NSS calls for an integrated approach which coordinates all the elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, economic, and military). The resulting broad range of interagency activities undertaken by the U.S. government to shape the international environment in order to avert threats and advance our national interests is commonly referred to as *peacetime engagement*.⁴⁶

Rothstein then provides a working definition...

Peacetime Engagement: Interagency activities of the U.S. Government, either unilateral or undertaken in cooperation with other national or non-nation state entities, to influence international conditions in such a manner as to protect or advance U.S. national interests abroad.⁴⁷

Rothstein then shows that the military is responsible for playing a role in engagement; citing the *1997 National Military Strategy*.⁴⁸

The military has an important role in engagement – helping to shape the international environment in appropriate ways to bring about a more peaceful and stable world.' Both the NSS and the *National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (NMS) reaffirm the commitment of the Nation to field a military force that is, first and foremost, capable of fighting and winning the Nation's wars. In defining the U.S. national military objectives, the NMS recognizes the equally important mission of engagement and the tasks associated with proactively shaping the global security environment. The NMS states unequivocally that '...our national military objectives are to Promote Peace and Stability and, when

45 NSS, p. 5, as quoted in Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 1.

46 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 2.

47 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 2.

48 *National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (NMS), 1997, taken from the CJCS foreword, as quoted in Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 2.

necessary, to Defeat Adversaries.” The NMS goes on to say that “U.S. Armed Forces advance national security by applying military power ... to help shape the international environment...”⁴⁹

Rothstein then cites the Annual Report of the (then) Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress.

In addition to other instruments of national power like diplomacy and economic trade and investment, the Department of Defense has an essential role to play in shaping the international security environment in ways that promote and protect U.S. national interests.⁵⁰

Noting that the above vision was expansive, Rothstein observed that the military had ample doctrine for warfighting (for which he substitutes the term "decisive operations"), but had not given sufficient thought to the interactive mix of such decisive operations with promoting peace and stability, Rothstein then develops the REC as an overarching concept for military operations.⁵¹ He proposed the following definition for Regional Engagement:

Regional Engagement is a continuous and proactive regionally oriented military activities conducted to gather information or influence international conditions in order to protect or advance United States national security interests abroad.⁵²

Highlighting the crucial difference between discrete and temporary efforts to address a specific problem, he points out that continuous efforts promise to promote the equilibrium of stability in a "steady state."

Significant aspects of this definition include the regional focus as well as the continuous and proactive nature of engagement activities. The regional focus reflects the manner in which the military organizes, trains, and equips its forces; apportions and allocates those forces; and conducts operations. This approach does not parallel that of many of the other U.S. government agencies involved in peacetime engagement [which present challenges for the military]. The continuous nature of regional engagement implies that these activities are not contingency operations conducted as a reaction to a crisis. They are instead steady state operations with activities

⁴⁹ Rothstein, H. (1999, June). pp. 2-3.

⁵⁰ Cohen, W. *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, 1998, Ch. 1, p. 6, as quoted in Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 3.

⁵¹ Rothstein, H. (1999, June). pp. 3-4.

⁵² Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 4.

constantly being executed in support of theater strategic objectives. The proactive nature of regional engagement indicates that tactical-level activities are part of a coordinated operational-level plan linking them to the geographic CINC's defined theater strategic objectives as articulated in his strategic-level Theater Engagement Plan (TEP). Both the TEP and the operational-level implementing plan are developed and executed in coordination with appropriate Other Government Agencies (OGAs). Regional engagement is usually performed as an integral part of an overall interagency effort with the DOD normally in a supporting role. Commonly, the Department of State (DOS) will be the lead agency. Occasionally OGAs will have the lead, and in rare circumstances, a DOD lead will be directed.⁵³

Rothstein identifies the quintessential difference between the military's traditional conception of its role, and the imperative requirement for continuous engagement: "influence."

Appreciating the different dynamics characterizing regional engagement activities designed to promote peace and stability and decisive operations designed to defeat adversaries is fundamental to understanding the [REP] concept....Decisive operations are coercive by nature. They involve the direct application of military power to compel an adversary to accede to the will of the United States and, when applicable, its allies. ***Regional engagement, on the other hand, is characterized by a different dynamic, that of influence.*** [Original highlighting and italics]. Regional engagement involves the discriminate, and often indirect, application of military power to persuade, encourage, guide, manipulate, or otherwise influence adversaries, allies, or neutrals to act in a manner consistent with, or supportive of, U.S. national interests.⁵⁴

In a similar vein, he also observes that engagement must be done in relation to changing conditions, in the context of a return to the preferred conditions of a "steady state."

When the global strategic environment is conducive to U.S. national interests, regional engagement activities provide military input to the interagency effort to monitor conditions and predict or report changes. As conditions erode, military power is applied through regional engagement activities to influence a return to a more desirable state. When conditions further deteriorate, coercive military force may be applied in the form of decisive operations to compel a return to acceptable conditions. At the operational level, shifting from an intent to influence conditions to an

⁵³ Rothstein, H. (1999, June). pp. 4-5.

⁵⁴ Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 5.

intent to compel change marks the transition from regional engagement to decisive operations. The decision to employ coercive force is made based on situation specific criteria and is political in nature. The predominant dynamic may not be apparent at the tactical level as discriminate use of combat operations may be employed as part of a regional engagement effort to influence conditions and behavior.⁵⁵

Rothstein takes the overarching and ideal civilian vision of what function peacetime engagement is expected to play...

Every dollar we devote to preventing conflicts, promoting democracy, and stopping the spread of disease and starvation brings a sure return in security and savings.⁵⁶

...and tailors it for a military audience:

The rationale for the “imperative of engagement” is well articulated in the NSS and NMS. That rationale is reiterated here in an abbreviated form *tailored specifically to military interests*. [*italics added*]. The rationale for regional engagement is not transitory, but rather will retain its validity over time.... This assertion is supported by... considerable [Army] research....[For example,] ...TRADOC's [(Training & Doctrine Command)]1998 annual report to the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) [stated], '[Army] research has consistently validated the continuing relevance of peacetime engagement activities for shaping the environment in 2025 in a manner supportive of U.S. national and *military* [*original italics*] interests.'⁵⁷

One wonders what result would have occurred if Army research had concluded that peacetime engagement was *not* relevant to the military's interests. In any case, Rothstein makes the argument that it is manifestly in the military's interest to embrace the REC concept.

From a military perspective, regional engagement provides six tangible benefits related to national security. These are avoiding war, informing policy makers and commanders, maintaining forward presence, facilitating decisive operations, facilitating conflict termination and securing the victory, and providing global economy of force. Three of these benefits (informing policy makers and commanders, facilitating decisive operations, and global economy of force) are essential to the U.S. military's ability to fight and win the nation's wars in the emerging global

55 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 5.

56 NSS, p. iv, as quoted in Rothstein, H. (1999). p. 6.

57 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 6.

and national security environment. Consequently, ignoring regional engagement requirements and maximizing the U.S. military solely for decisive operations is counterproductive to the goal of defeating adversaries. *Regional engagement, therefore, is not a requirement competing with military readiness to fight and win, but rather an integral part of that readiness and must receive appropriate consideration in the resource allocation process. [original italics].*"⁵⁸

Each benefit is then explained in greater narrative detail:

Avoiding War: The old adage "An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure" sums up this benefit rather nicely. The advantages of avoiding war in terms of preserving resources and saving lives are self-evident. The resources expended and lives lost, even in a conflict of short duration, can have a catastrophic effect on future readiness, even when victory is achieved. Virtually all professional soldiers recognize war as a recourse to be pursued only when other means fail.⁵⁹

Informing Policy Makers and Commanders. The second benefit of regional engagement relates to keeping policy makers well informed. As... forward basing of U.S. forces is reduced, the need for accurate and timely decision making by policy makers is increased. Accurate and timely input to the policy decision making process may totally avert a potential crisis. Equally significant, well-timed decision making is critical to future power projection. Even with the enhanced strategic mobility envisioned in the future, the tyranny of time and distance remains. Ample evidence exists that our potential adversaries learned well from DESERT STORM the danger of allowing the U.S. to deliberately build an unopposed lodgment. Delays in decision making resulting from incomplete military information will certainly increase the costs of initial entry operations, if not doom them to failure.⁶⁰

The enhanced situation awareness made possible by regional engagement activities permits early and informed decisions by policy makers. These timely and accurate decisions may result in more rapid crisis resolution or permit the exploitation of situations in furtherance of U.S. national security interests. Early, informed decisions by policy makers significantly reduce the risks associated with initial entry operations, support strategic preclusion, and are conducive to success in decisive operations. Enhanced situation awareness permits military commanders, to include the geographic Commander-in-Chief (CINC) and joint and/or combined expeditionary force (CJEF) commanders, to refine plans and issue orders in a manner that optimizes resources and ensures that objectives are

58 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 7.

59 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 7.

60 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 7.

achieved. This applies to regional engagement plans and orders as well as those for contingency operations and Major Theater War (MTW).⁶¹

Maintaining Forward Presence Regional engagement presents a politically viable and relatively low-cost means to maintain forward presence in the future. The absence of the Soviet threat and the growing strength of international and regional security organizations renders significant numbers of forward-based conventional U.S. forces an increasing political liability. Additionally, the costs of maintaining such permanent presence have become increasingly difficult to justify. Lacking a common threat, the political risks attendant with the permanent basing of U.S. forces in countries with security interests and national objectives potentially divergent, if not directly contradictory to our own, are becoming less acceptable. Some degree of forward military presence, however, continues to have unquestioned value, both in achieving the other benefits listed herein and in demonstrating U.S. resolve and commitment.⁶²

Regional engagement facilitates maintaining an acceptable level of forward presence. The small footprint of many regional engagement activities reduces political liability to host governments. The costs of small numbers of forward-deployed forces are lower and more responsive to resource constraints than those of large conventional forward-stationed forces. The flexibility to quickly add or withdraw forward-deployed troops reduces the risk of being compromised by the actions and policies of a host nation or third party over which we may have no influence. Additionally, changing troop dispositions and force levels through forward-deployment can effectively signal U.S. policy and resolve."⁶³

Rothstein then lists several ways the REC can "facilitate the transition to decisive operations; to include initial entry of forces and subsequent combat."⁶⁴

Providing Intelligence. Near real-time intelligence provided by military "eyes on target" during planning and execution of operations can be instrumental in achieving the information dominance generally acknowledged as critical to future military operations. Military Human Intelligence (HUMINT) provides insights unobtainable through technical means (such as an assessment of enemy or allied intent) and is less vulnerable to technological counter measures than other intelligence assets. Intelligence provided can include, but is not limited to, target acquisition, reconnaissance and surveillance of points of entry (Drop/Landing zones [DZ/LZs], Beach Landing Sites [BLS], airfields,

61 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). pp. 7-8.

62 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 8.

63 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 8.

64 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 8.

etc.), reports regarding the location, status, capabilities, and intentions of forces, both friendly and adversary, and information about the condition and availability of infrastructure and local sources of logistics.⁶⁵

Establishing force protection [Army] research... [has] "...demonstrated the clear vulnerability of the deployment process and infrastructure to disruptive attacks by a determined adversary." The traditional concept of deliberate force buildup and the future concept of strategic preclusion both share this vulnerability resulting from the proliferation of advanced military technologies and long-range precision munitions. The REC provides a means to minimize these risks. Use of forward presence regional engagement forces to protect and support the force during deployment and transition to decisive operations has been demonstrated [by such research].to be essential.... The vulnerability of initial entry forces to enemy action is reduced through combat actions by forward-deployed regional engagement forces and defensive source nets, particularly near Air and Sea Ports of Disembarkation (APODs and SPODs) and Intermediate Staging Bases (ISBs). Additionally, direct links to indigenous security forces permit synchronization of host nation and deploying U.S. force protection assets to create the most secure environment possible. In the combat zone, regional engagement forces can establish security on points of entry (DZ/LZs, airfields, BLS, etc.) or on critical infrastructure (bridges, dams, etc.). Through their relations with indigenous and coalition forces, regional engagement elements can assist the CJEF commander in coordinating the early and effective integration of the total capability of the multi-national force for force protection. This integration of capabilities may include air defense and ground security.⁶⁶

Enhancing coalition operations. Long-term presence and the resulting established relationships between indigenous militaries and U.S. forces performing regional engagement activities provide a solid foundation for forming effective coalitions. Both the need to form such coalitions and the difficulty in rapidly achieving effective force integration have characterized recent military operational experience and research efforts into the nature of future warfare. [Recent wargames have] highlighted the criticality and difficulty of attaining effective early integration of coalition forces. In-place regional engagement forces are well positioned and prepared to promote total force integration. These forces can provide effective liaison, an accurate assessment of capabilities and intentions, coordinate intelligence sharing, and assist in establishing integrated command, control, and support structures and procedures.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ Rothstein, H. (1999, June). pp. 8-9.

⁶⁶ Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 9.

⁶⁷ Rothstein, H. (1999, June). pp. 9-10.

Facilitating in-theater logistics. Future military response to crisis will likely include long-range strategic deployment followed by rapid employment of forces. This suggests increased reliance on in-place and regionally pre-positioned logistics. Regional engagement forces are well positioned to identify, coordinate, and verify the type, amount, and availability of indigenous logistical support, both government and civilian. In-place support reduces demands on strategic mobility assets, which in turn allows more rapid deployment of combat forces. Additionally, it reduces the level of risk attendant to long and fragile logistical support channels. Information provided by forward-deployed regional engagement forces creates logistical situation awareness and permits integration of locally available sources of support into the CJEF commander's operational plan. Regional engagement forces present in the AO are able to continually verify the presence and availability of such sources of support and secure them for use by U.S. forces.⁶⁸

Preempting an adversary's ability to present the U.S. and the world with a *fait accompli* and achieve a strategic and operational positional advantage is core to future force employment concepts for decisive operations. The forward presence of U.S. forces performing regional engagement activities provides a CJEF commander with in-place resources to counter initial enemy actions. Additionally, regional engagement activities, to include advisory assistance and pre-crisis combined training, can significantly enhance the capability of indigenous forces to resist initial enemy action prior to the arrival of U.S. or coalition reinforcements. Additionally, forward-deployed regional engagement forces can coordinate support to indigenous forces from early arriving U.S. elements (such as airpower) to achieve a synergistic effect that maximizes destruction of enemy capabilities. The role of regional engagement forces in enhancing the capability of indigenous forces to offer initial resistance can prove decisive in attaining strategic preclusion. The very presence of U.S. forces with indigenous forces is likely to signal U.S. resolve to the enemy as well as friendly forces, stiffening the indigenous force's will to resist.⁶⁹

Shaping the battlespace. Regional engagement forces made up of trained warfighters may be integrated into the CJEF commander's effort to shape the battlespace prior to and during the arrival of initial entry forces. Acting on mission orders from the supported CJEF commander, forward-deployed regional engagement forces can perform Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) functions; conduct direct action missions to strip away specified enemy capabilities, conduct information operations (IO) attacks, provide terminal guidance for long-range precision munitions, and conduct stay behind sabotage and subversion (unconventional warfare) operations against high payoff

68 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 10.

69 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 10.

targets. Regional engagement forces will be able to leverage future integrated global systems of secure communications and fire control. This will permit CJEF commanders to begin engaging targets while still in the initial stages of deployment, applying coercive combat power prior to closing with the enemy. Regional engagement forces empowered to decide, detect, and deliver extended range munitions will be able to leverage future global communications and advanced precision munitions to execute discriminate target engagement initiated and controlled near the point of impact.⁷⁰

Establishing initial forward Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) capability. The presence of forward-deployed headquarters elements of regional engagement forces provides a CJEF commander with a vehicle for establishing effective C4I in the Area of Operations (AO) immediately. Additionally, regional Special Operations Commands (SOCs) involved in regional engagement activities are recognized as providing a unique capability for '...very rapid establishment of joint task forces to respond to lower end contingencies.' Thus, regional engagement provides a framework for establishing an initial C4I capability prior to arrival of a CJEF headquarters or an in-theater C4I option for smaller scale contingency operations. Even with the advent of global communications systems, the advantages to having a forward located command headquarters remain. This particularly true with coalitions where advanced technologies may not be equally distributed and C4I systems and procedures will likely not be compatible. The regional engagement C4I structure can be employed to effectively synchronize the battlespace during the early stages of force deployment.⁷¹

Facilitating Conflict Termination and Securing the Victory. Decisive operations create an environment in which conditions favorable to the long-term national security interests of the U.S. can be reestablished. Emerging doctrine for Stability And Support Operations (SASO) may provide a concept for transition from decisive operations toward steady state regional engagement activities. Such a transition, however, must move U.S. efforts from the unsustainable short-term level of effort associated with decisive operations to a sustainable steady state effort. Simply disengaging puts the victory at risk, allowing threats to resurface and the opportunity won at such cost to pass. The follow-on steady state operations required are those of regional engagement. Rapidly transitioning from the coercive conflict resolution force structure back to regional engagement forces and command structures permits early disengagement. This early disengagement of the contingency force also

70 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). pp. 10-11

71 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 11.

reestablishes U.S. capability to respond to new emerging crisis elsewhere in the complex multi-polar global security environment of the future.⁷²

Providing Global Economy of Force. The proliferation of threats in the global security environment presents increased risk of multiple simultaneous crises'. Potential adversaries may view a U.S. commitment to one or more contingencies as an opportunity to act. The global presence of regional engagement forces outside contingency AOs continues to signal U.S. resolve, provides early warning of potential trouble spots, and presents a mechanism for resolving a potential crisis short of war.⁷³

Having laid out both the rationale for regional engagement and its utility to the military, Rothstein then discusses how it can be conceived in military practice.

The Regional Engagement Concept (REC) is presented in three parts; the characteristics of regional engagement, the regional engagement mission area, and the regional engagement force. [The REC] provides a *conceptual* framework for conducting regional engagement activities [and] *Specific Doctrine, Training, Leader development, Organization, Materiel, and Soldiers (DTLOMS)* considerations for implementing the concept.⁷⁴

He begins by noting that "the REC is defined by three fundamental characteristics critical to its effective implementation. These are continuous operations, unity of effort, and human factors dominance."⁷⁵

Effective regional engagement activities are characterized by continuous planning and execution. The very nature of regional engagement... requires that its related activities constantly be in some state of execution. Regional engagement is different from warfighting in that the latter provides an opportunity for detailed planning supported by battle-focused training followed by execution. The basis for conducting regional engagement is a time-driven political-operational tempo rather than a warfighting event-driven tempo. Planning, control, and tactical execution must proceed concurrently and without interruption.⁷⁶

Currently evolving Theater Engagement Plans (TEPs) comprising theater strategic planning and defining theater strategic engagement objectives are critical to, but do not obviate the need for, operational level planning,

72 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). pp. 11-12

73 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 12.

74 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 13.

75 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 13.

76 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 13.

objectives, and synchronization. Similarly, independently developed country team plans directed by multiple program managers fail to produce the synchronization and synergistic effects which allow realization of the contributions to national security.... In the absence of a comprehensive operational level plan with oversight vested in a sole headquarters, these actions may enjoy tactical success and still fail to contribute to theater military objectives. On occasion, they can be counterproductive at the operational level even while achieving tactical success. To effectively apply operational art, the REC calls for establishing a *single manager* [original italics] for regional engagement activities and developing an operational level regional engagement *campaign plan*. This single manager is responsible to the geographic CINC for developing and executing the operational level plan linking tactical regional engagement activities to the strategic level TEP.⁷⁷

Most contemporary futures projects postulate that a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) has either already occurred, is occurring, or is imminent. The theory is that the RMA is principally the result of leap-ahead advances in technology, information technology in particular. Regional engagement represents an exception to this trend. While advanced technologies will undoubtedly enhance specific capabilities and increase certain vulnerabilities, human factors and the human dimensions of conflict will likely continue to dominate regional engagement activities.... [In] regional engagement, carefully selected, well-prepared soldiers and leaders will continue to be disproportionately important relative to technology. The sole exception to this condition related to WMD.⁷⁸

Stating that "facilitating policy makers', military commanders', and other specified individuals' and organizations' situation awareness is a principle function of the REC,"⁷⁹ Rothstein then discusses its three inter-related mission "areas" and role played by soldiers in each.

The regional engagement mission area consists of three interrelated functions: *situation awareness*, *strategic shaping*, and *battlespace preparation/restoration*. Forces conducting regional engagement operations perform in one or more of the three roles that directly correspond to the three functions. These roles are *global scouts*, *global shapers*, and *global transition forces* [original italics].⁸⁰

⁷⁷ Rothstein, H. (1999, June). pp. 13-14

⁷⁸ Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 14.

⁷⁹ Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 15.

⁸⁰ Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 15.

Situation Awareness: A full appreciation of present and probable future circumstances and the intended actions of relevant parties in a specified actual or potential area of operations. This appreciation includes an understanding of the impact of those circumstances and intended actions on the plans and policies of the U.S. and its allies. Situation awareness further includes comprehension of both the intended and unintended consequences of U.S. actions, plans, and policies.⁸¹

The REC provides information instrumental to developing full situation awareness through two mechanisms. These are the tactical forces performing in the role of global scouts and the dedicated intelligence architecture designed to obtain and exploit information from global scouts.⁸²

Global Scouts: Appropriately selected and trained U.S. Military personnel who, through their assigned regional engagement activities, are effectively positioned and fully competent to observe and report information of tactical, operational, and strategic significance.⁸³

As engagement is predicated on presence, presence provides opportunity to observe, observation assumes reporting, and such reporting has many legal intricacies, Rothstein goes into some detail concerning the reporting role of the global scout.

Performing as global scouts, forces conducting missions as part of a regional engagement campaign provide a military human intelligence (HUMINT) capability by observing and interpreting conditions, attitudes, and actions. They provide ground truth to commanders and other interested parties. At the same time, these global scouts are establishing personal contacts and developing the regional orientation that will enable them to become increasingly effective in performing the other regional engagement functions. While future technological developments will undoubtedly further enhance already formidable technical intelligence capabilities, HUMINT remains the only platform capable of placing human judgment at the point of collection. The ability to gather impressions, discern intentions, and convey them to persons removed from the AO is indispensable in developing plans and implementing actions designed to protect and advance U.S. interests. This type of HUMINT further enhances the probability of gaining accurate early warning of

81 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 15.

82 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 15

83 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 15

intentions and impending actions as well as providing verification, context, and background for interpreting data gathered by technical means.⁸⁴

The HUMINT capability provided by global scouts is sensitive to the military related nuances of situations, attitudes, and conditions on the ground in areas of national interest. This constitutes a vital supplement to HUMINT provided by OGAs and other DOD assets. The effectiveness and unique value of global scout HUMINT to the overall information-gathering apparatus is rooted in two factors related to the military nature of the asset. The first of these is that global scouts are from the armed forces and are part of its warfighting culture. Therefore, global scouts perceive and report information from a military perspective. No other HUMINT asset is as well prepared to support the information needs of military commanders. The second factor is access. In the United States, the uniformed services are, by constitution and law, subordinate to and servants of the civil leadership of the government. Dissimilarly, in many other nations, the military is involved in numerous aspects of the political, social, and economic segments of government and society. The global scout's typical positioning with a host nation's military invites access to activities, institutions, and thought processes not normally available to other sources.⁸⁵

"Global scouts obtain information by... incidental observation, passive reconnaissance, and active collection. Each technique has advantages and disadvantages, specific approval requirements and procedures, unique training requirements, and its own political sensitivities."⁸⁶

Incidental observation is the least politically sensitive of the techniques and is employed by all forces participating in regional engagement activities. Global scouts employing incidental observation simply perform the specific tactical mission that they were assigned. They are not advised of any particular information requirements.... Ideally, the global scout will not be aware of the specific requirement being fulfilled, even after debriefing. These debriefers must also be sensitive to potential information "windfalls" that may unpredictably turn up from unexpected sources. This technique is entirely passive and completely dependent upon open consensual access to information.⁸⁷

84 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 15

85 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 16

86 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 16

87 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 16

Passive reconnaissance is similar to incidental observation, differing only in that the global scout is aware of the relevant information requirements. This awareness may come from being sensitized by intelligence personnel or through the personal training and experience of the global scout. Being cognizant of the information requirement increases the probability that the global scout will observe and remember the desired information. The distinguishing characteristic of passive reconnaissance is, however, that active collection is *not* authorized or undertaken. The global scout may not initiate any action primarily designed to acquire specific information or deviate in any way from his assigned tactical mission in order to obtain such information. This technique increases political sensitivity and the risk that an individual global scout will exceed his authority and vary from his stated mission. Consequently, passive reconnaissance should only be employed by mature, appropriately trained, and politically sensitive global scouts. This technique is most appropriate for use by SOF or other specially selected and properly trained elements. As with incidental observation, passive reconnaissance is (as the name implies) passive in nature and dependent upon consensual access to information.⁸⁸

Active collection... carries the greatest risk and highest degree of political sensitivity. Active collection is tightly controlled by well-established procedures that must be strictly followed. Such activities may compromise the individual global scout, the overall regional engagement mission, and U.S. foreign policy. Active collection should be undertaken only after careful consideration of the risks involved - and then only when approved or directed by the appropriate authority. Any global scout participating in active collection requires specialized training and very clear mission guidance. This type of activity is normally conducted only where high priority requirements exist and cannot be fulfilled in any other manner. An example might be HUMINT verification of a WMD threat.⁸⁹

Rothstein thus makes an important distinction between the military global scout and the civilian and military professional HUMINT operative. The REC does not conceive the global scout's role in engagement, presence, observation, and reporting primarily as espionage.

The global scout's principal tactical mission is not normally intelligence collection. In most instances, the global scout will be forward deployed to conduct specific tasks or missions. Examples of such missions include participating in multi-national exercises or military to military contacts, providing training assistance to host nation military forces, or any of a variety of other common or evolving peacetime military activities. The

⁸⁸ Rothstein, H. (1999, June). pp. 16-17

⁸⁹ Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 17

generally passive nature of the global scout's information gathering activities does not diminish the value of his presence, the sources or information to which he is exposed, or the impressions he develops.⁹⁰

He notes that the timeliness of intelligence is related to the architecture that would receive and develop it. Although in the REC this seems to be a subordinate point, it does indicate a measurement to the extent passive observation and reporting occurs, versus more deliberate intelligence activities.

As alluded to previously, intelligence architecture and procedures for effectively exploiting the global scouts are also critical to developing situation awareness. This architecture must capture and manage the information provided by the global scouts. Doing so requires dedicated assets focused specifically on this task. In order to provide timely information to the appropriate users, such assets must be fully integrated into the national intelligence architecture. Appropriate information must be retrieved from the deployed global scout without waiting until the mission is complete. Such remote debriefing is facilitated by leveraging emerging information technologies.⁹¹

It is important to note that the information observation and reporting made possible by continuous presence, while important, is nevertheless secondary to maintaining the presence itself. This observation is important to both the REC and the GEP.

Critical to effective regional engagement is the continuous presence of global scouts, employed throughout the geographic CINC's Area Of Responsibility (AOR), particularly in those areas identified for special attention in the TEP. Opportunities must be seized, or created when necessary, to ensure that global scouts are able to maintain continuous presence. Access and region (or country) specific orientations are not automatic or rapidly generated. This creates a requirement to maintain some level of presence throughout the region, even in areas not specified as high priority in the TEP.⁹²

Commanders and planners develop thorough situation awareness based on information provided by the global scouts and integrated with information from all other available sources. They use this situation awareness to refine regional engagement campaign plans, producing and implementing orders for actions to avert potential crisis and exploit opportunities to

⁹⁰ Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 17

⁹¹ Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 17

⁹² Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 18

advance U.S. national interests. Each individual operation should be closely examined to ensure it contributes to operational-level regional engagement objectives and to assure synchronization with other ongoing or planned missions. All plans and operations must be supportive of, and carefully synchronized with, the objectives of interagency peacetime engagement in the region.⁹³

Rothstein next discusses the function of strategic shaping and global shapers.

Strategic Shaping: Military actions taken to resolve potential crisis short of decisive operations or to exploit opportunities to advance U.S. national security interests.⁹⁴

The operational and tactical level activities conducted in accordance with these plans and orders comprise the function of strategic shaping within the context of the REC. Such activities may include, but are not limited to, defense cooperation, unilateral, joint, and multi-national training, joint/combined/multi-national exercises, humanitarian relief actions, advisory assistance, infrastructure development, security assistance, and technical support. These activities may be initiated in support of a variety of engagement objectives ranging from war avoidance to simply advancing specified U.S. interests. Strategic shaping activities may be designed for purposes as diverse as deterring potential aggressors or developing infrastructure to enhance U.S. economic interests in a region. Infrastructure development may also serve to prepare facilities for use by U.S. forces in response to a future crisis. Synchronizing such activities with contingency plans can optimally manage resources, accomplishing multiple objectives simultaneously."⁹⁵

"The REC envisions accomplishing such strategic shaping using forces acting as global shapers. Global shapers are soldiers drawn from throughout the military forces structure. Force selection should leverage organic capabilities developed for wartime tasks whenever possible."⁹⁶

Global Shapers: U.S. military personnel, deployed abroad in peacetime to perform tactical missions as part of an operational level regional engagement campaign designed to shape the strategic environment for the purpose of avoiding war or advancing u.s. national interests.⁹⁷

⁹³ Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 18

⁹⁴ Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 18

⁹⁵ Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 18

⁹⁶ Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 18

⁹⁷ Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 18

In discussing the global shaper, Rothstein highlights the importance of their unique military mindset. This is reminiscent of Clausewitz' genius for war,⁹⁸ and is an important observation for both the REC and the GEP. It also highlights the political nature of such soldiers and roles as distinct from the "social worker" pejorative.

The basis of the uniqueness and value of the global shaper, as with the global scout, is his military background and links to the warfighting capabilities, resources, and culture of the Armed Forces. The military is not intended to be a "uniformed Peace Corps" or to duplicate the capabilities of non-governmental or private volunteer organizations (NGOs or PVOs). It is imperative to identify those functions and activities that are optimally performed by the military (due to access, special capability, or threat condition, among other factors) while avoiding those activities best performed by other organizations.⁹⁹

Essential to achieving a close alignment of unique military capabilities with regional engagement strategic shaping requirements is identification of a core group of military regional engagement professionals. These professionals should be thoroughly familiar with capabilities, roles and missions of the military as well as those of other governmental and non-governmental organizations. Such forces should be drawn from organizations whose wartime missions closely align with the requirements of regional engagement. SOF is a potential source for such a cadre of professionals.¹⁰⁰

Critical to the concept is the strategic shaper's ability to act as a force multiplier. He works with foreign military, paramilitary, and civilian counterparts to achieve positive results disproportionately large in comparison to the U.S. investment of resources. Deployed regional engagement elements continue to perform the role of global scouts even as they enter the more operationally proactive mode of strategic shapers.¹⁰¹

Rothstein then discusses Battlespace Preparation/Restoration and Global Transition Forces

Not all wars are avoidable. When *influence* fails to achieve a set of circumstances acceptable to U.S. political leadership, the *coercive* capability of the nation must be employed and the armed forces may

98 Clausewitz, C. (1968). pp. 138-157. "Every special calling in life, if it is to be followed with success, requires peculiar qualifications of understanding and soul. Where they are of a high order, and manifest themselves by extraordinary achievements, the mind to which they belong is termed genius." (p. 138).

99 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 19

100 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 19

101 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 19

conduct decisive operations to impose acceptable conditions. The REC provides forward-deployed forces permitting the geographic CINC or his designated CJEF commander to begin to create conditions supportive of his operational plans prior to, or concurrent with, deployment and employment of the main force. Similarly, regional engagement forces can facilitate the early withdrawal of decisive operations forces and the transition back to the steady state activities associated with the regional engagement functions of strategic shaping and situation awareness. This return to steady state regional engagement functions is essential to secure the victory.¹⁰²

Battlespace Preparation/Restoration: Battlespace preparation comprises activities of the forward-deployed regional engagement forces to establish conditions that enable initial entry and decisive operations by forces capable of defeating an adversary. Battlespace restoration comprises activities of regional engagement elements to expedite the withdrawal of forces following decisive operations. These activities facilitate transition to the steady state regional engagement functions of strategic shaping and situation awareness in order to secure the victory.¹⁰³

Traditionally large-scale contingencies and MTW have required that an initial lodgment be established to permit overwhelming force to be massed in theater. Decisive operations were initiated only after adequate forces and supplies were in place.... The term strategic preclusion represents the idea of introducing forces so rapidly and with such lethality that an adversary cannot gain or consolidate a significant operational advantage. It involves use of strategic maneuver whereby forces are deployed from the Continental United States (CONUS) support base through ISBs and directly into combat. These concepts are rendered feasible by leveraging future advanced technologies and concepts for strategic mobility and logistics. The benefits of regional engagement in terms of force protection and battlespace preparation... are increased when strategic preclusion is attempted. The long and fragile logistics support channels required, coupled with the commitment of forces to combat prior to massing overwhelming force, place even greater importance on the presence of forward-deployed forces positioned to facilitate initial entry operations.¹⁰⁴

Global Transition Forces: Regional engagement forces preparing or restoring the battlespace are referred to as global transition forces. [These forces are] regional engagement forces forward deployed prior to decisive operations, or remaining deployed after decisive operations, in a contingency or MTW AO. These forces assist in establishing conditions conducive to success prior to initial entry and decisive operations.

102 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 19

103 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 19

104 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). pp. 20-21

Following decisive operations, they assist in establishing the conditions conducive to a return to steady state regional engagement activities and long-term success.¹⁰⁵

The continuous employment of regional engagement forces envisioned by the REC provides for the presence of global transition forces in virtually any potential contingency AO. Adequate force structure to maintain a large presence in every corner of the globe does not exist. The REC, therefore, calls for prioritizing resources, maintaining minimal forces acting as global scouts where crisis is improbable and increasing presence as a situation deteriorates. The enhanced situation awareness provided by global scouts permits accurate and timely reallocation and adjustment of the disposition of regional engagement forces. Global transition forces leverage their warfighting skills, forward presence, and prior mission activities to provide real-time HUMINT, force protection, strip away enemy capabilities, delay enemy set, facilitate coalition integration, provide early forward C4I, and verify and obtain indigenous logistical support.¹⁰⁶

In reiterating the importance of achieving the equilibrium of a "steady state" before and after a transition to/from decisive operations, Rothstein notes the flexibility of REC forces.

The sequential and concurrent performance of all three regional engagement roles (global scouts, global shapers, and global transition forces) and functions (situation awareness, strategic shaping, and battlespace preparation/restoration) is fundamental to the concept of regional engagement. For example, regional engagement forces acting as global scouts may transition to the role of global shapers, but will continue to serve as global scouts as well.¹⁰⁷

The transition from regional engagement to decisive operations within a specific geographical area requires that appropriate portions of forces previously deployed for regional engagement shift to their wartime missions and be integrated into the CJEF. The wartime mission profiles of SOF are conducive to such a transition, again highlighting the utility of SOF in regional engagement. The forward presence of SOF in a regional engagement role facilitates performance of their wartime missions of Unconventional Warfare (UW), Special Reconnaissance (SR), Direct Action (DA), unconventional assisted personnel recovery, and coalition support. Consequently, regional engagement activities do not preclude involved forces from performing their wartime missions. Additionally,

¹⁰⁵ Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 21

¹⁰⁶ Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 21

¹⁰⁷ Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 21

some SOF, principally civil affairs (CA) units forming part of the forward-deployed regional engagement force, are uniquely prepared and positioned to support population and resource control (PRC) and humanitarian relief operations. These activities may include refugee management and coordinating the role of NGOs and PVOs within the AO.¹⁰⁸

The versatility of engagement forces benefits the limited expenditure of decisive forces and promises a speedy restoration to the steady state. In the context of American and coalition activities in present day Iraq and elsewhere, the utility of Rothstein's concept seems particularly prescient.

Battlespace restoration facilitates the withdrawal of contingency forces and the resumption of steady state regional engagement activities. As forces are withdrawn, global transition forces remain with the responsibility to secure the victory during transition back to the steady state functions of strategic shaping and situation awareness. Immediately withdrawing forces following decisive operations may imperil the gains achieved by such actions.... [Moreover,] in the multi-polar world of today and the future, long-term commitment of the limited U.S. forces capable of conducting decisive operations engagement type activities does not support U.S. national security interests. Neither does it make effective use of these resources. The potential for crisis' erupting in other locations demands that such scarce national resources be withdrawn and reconstituted as expeditiously as possible. This challenge suggests the return of responsibility for the contingency AO to regional engagement forces acting as global transition forces as soon as the threat, conditions, and political considerations will permit. Global transition forces will conduct the following types of activities, among others, to secure the benefits of regional engagement [:]....Security operations. In conjunction with host nation forces, global transition forces retain adequate combat power to deal with isolated incidents of resistance and secure borders. The level of combat power in the global transition forces may be adjusted to match the threat level relative to the capabilities of host nation security forces [:] Infrastructure restoration. The global transition forces, in coordination with other available organizations (governmental and non-governmental), begin work to restore host nation infrastructure to foster stability and further U.S. interests. Military capabilities should only be applied to those efforts where other agencies are unable to perform such missions [:] Humanitarian assistance. Following decisive operations, the commander's moral and legal responsibility to the civil populace, combined with U.S. national security interests as presented in the NSS,

¹⁰⁸ Rothstein, H. (1999, June). pp. 21-22

demands that every effort be made to ensure civilian access to adequate human services. The global transition forces assume responsibility for these requirements.¹⁰⁹

The ultimate objective of global transition forces is to transform seamlessly back into the roles of global shapers and scouts. This transition can only take place following the completion of large-scale SASO performed by the CJEF immediately following the successful conclusion of decisive operations. The return to steady state regional engagement operations signals operational and strategic success. In summary, regional engagement forces acting as global transition forces facilitate the transition to and from decisive operations by means of battlespace preparation and restoration. These activities can be instrumental to the success of decisive operations and in ensuring the long-term victory.¹¹⁰

Rothstein repeatedly reiterates the central theme that engagement operations thus conceived must be continuous.

The REC defines regional engagement activities as continuous. Even during the conduct of decisive operations within a contingency or MTW AO, regional engagement activities continue throughout the remainder of region and world. These activities serve the dual purposes of global economy of force and strategic/operational protection of the contingency commander's 'flanks' and 'rear.'¹¹¹

Nor are the benefits of engagement simply abroad. Although writing in 1999, Rothstein has already identified the utility of the REC in supporting Homeland Defense.

Regional engagement supports homeland defense in a manner similar to that in which it supports decisive operations. Global scouts can provide early warnings and indications from Outside the Continental United States (OCONUS) that may assist planners and operators in preparing for and conducting homeland defense operations. Further, global scouts can provide insights and information regarding the culture, intentions, methods, and capabilities of threats to the U.S. homeland from OCONUS. Global shapers may be able to intercept or otherwise influence a potential threat to CONUS, acting unilaterally, through, or in concert with foreign forces. In some cases, resolving the underlying causes of a potential or emerging threat to security of the homeland may eliminate the peril. Global shapers are positioned to perform this function. Global shapers may be able to identify imminent threats to the U.S. homeland, determine

¹⁰⁹ Rothstein, H. (1999, June). pp. 22-23

¹¹⁰ Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 23

¹¹¹ Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 23

their intentions, or even 'canalize' their approach. They may be able to neutralize the capabilities of certain adversaries, an especially critical function in the case of those capabilities and adversaries difficult to identify or attack domestically.¹¹²

Having laid out the rationale, military utility, characteristics, and roles, Rothstein then outlines an intuitive force structure and a reasonable system of command relationships.

In order to provide the single manager required by the REC, a Regional Engagement Force (REF) must be established. The REF serves as the geographic CINC's operational level headquarters for planning, control, and execution of the theater regional engagement campaign in support of the strategic-level TEP.... REFs are formed on the basis of one per geographic CINC and are comprised of a dedicated standing joint headquarters staffed by regional engagement professionals with assigned or apportioned core and supporting regional engagement forces.... These core forces are augmented with appropriate supporting units from the conventional force structure. Regional engagement supporting forces may include combat, combat support, and combat service support elements from any service.... To ensure that the commander and key elements of the REF staff meet the profile of regional engagement professionals, the theater Special Operations Command (SOC) provides the nucleus for, and exercises OPCON of, the REF.... The SOC commander is dual-hatted as the REF commander.... Creating a subordinate JTF to act as the REF and plan, control, and execute the regional engagement campaign permits the SOC to remain actively engaged in the theater war planning process.... Subordinate JTF's may be established under the REF for specific missions.... In addition to forces OPCON to the REF, other joint and service forces may participate in the regional engagement campaign in the course of their activities.... The REF has a joint support element to coordinate service support to the various subordinate joint tactical elements conducting regional engagement activities.... The REF staff is characterized by robust liaison, Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Civil Affairs (CA), intelligence, contracting, and communications cells as well as senior representation from OGAs (e.g. DOS, United States Agency for International Development [USAID], and others as required)."¹¹³

The Army component of the REF would be a Special Operations Group (SOG).

¹¹² Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 24

¹¹³ Rothstein, H. (1999, June). pp. 25-27




Figure 1. REC: Special Operations Group; Army Component of Theater SOF. (From: Rothstein, H. (June 1999). *Regional Engagement: An Army Special Operations Forces Approach To Future Theater Military Operations*, p. 49. Fort Bragg, NC: USAJFKSWCS Battle Lab.

Note that the SF, CA, and PSYOP units are co-located under the same structure

The SOG's organic core regional engagement forces include SF, PSYOP, and CA units. These units comprise the SOG's assigned forces with supporting forces attached or OPCON as required. Special Operations Aviation (SOA) and Rangers are normally globally apportioned, but may be assigned or attached to the SOG as core or supporting regional engagement forces based on mission requirements.... The SOG possesses the full range of SF capabilities.... The SOG's organic SF units provide the C4I and support framework for deployed elements performing regional engagement missions. SOG SF units are structured to accept attachment and provide C4I of other SOF and supporting conventional forces.... The SOG's organic PSYOP unit(s) is the forward-deployed element of a global PSYOP force structure. In accordance with future PSYOP operational concepts, this element is relatively small, leveraging future advanced technologies to rely on "reach back" capabilities to a strategic PSYOP Group in CONUS for much of its capability. It provides the bulk of the REF's organic PSYOP capability and is structured to function as a joint PSYOP headquarters synchronizing all REF PSYOP assets.... The SOG features a robust organic AC CA structure and reinforcing RC units specifically organized and equipped to satisfy regional engagement requirements. Each SOG's organic CA units are tailored to meet the anticipated demands of its specific region. Each SOG will have an assigned AC CA element to coordinate all regional engagement CA functions within the assigned area. This element, comprised largely of CA generalists will also satisfy immediate response CA requirements

throughout the region until the specialists resident in the larger RC CA units can be mobilized and deployed to the respective theater.¹¹⁴

Rothstein then discusses the component and tactical command and support relationships.

SOF service components and their subordinate elements comprise the previously described core regional engagement forces... Tactical regional engagement activities are conducted by subordinate elements of the REF.... normally task organized based on specific mission requirements. These elements may be service pure or joint. Both SOF and regional engagement forces often operate as joint elements at the tactical level. Tactical elements are formed using SOF core regional engagement units as a basis for the task-organized units. These core SOF units provide the regional engagement specific skills and capabilities (such as cultural awareness, language proficiency, regional orientation, etc) for the task-organized units. Supporting conventional forces are attached or OPCON to these SOF elements.¹¹⁵

Having laid out the need for to put the REC into operation, Rothstein nevertheless cautions against irrational exuberance; the REC is suitable for some important reasons and should be implemented, but it is not a replacement for decisive forces. He states that the REC...

...is not intended to suggest that America's military should be optimized exclusively or even primarily for regional engagement. There are those who would be tempted to argue that the 'most likely use of military forces in the next 5 to 10 years will be in the 'nontraditional' category or 'unconventional combat,'. Even if this prediction is true, we cannot afford to maximize U.S. military forces for only one band of strategic requirements. On the contrary, the results of the Quadrennial Defense Review point to a need for a "capabilities-based" military force that is full spectrum in nature with a full set of capabilities to execute our national security strategy. Experience has proven that a "prevent and deter" capability has no meaning without a balanced "deter and fight" capability. The REC does not argue for a bifurcated force—one that fights wars and one that executes operations other than war. Rather, it is an argument for a force structure optimized from a holistic point of view, recognizing the interdependence of operations across the continuum.¹¹⁶

114 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 51.

115 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). pp. 27-28

116 Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 33.

Finally, and of significant interest to the GEP, Rothstein then makes practical recommendations for how to evolve a REC capability through focused efforts concerning doctrine, training, leader development, organization, material, and soldiers (DTLOMS). These efforts in the context of the REC as conceived are unobjectionable and would be appropriate -- in fact necessary -- for the strictly military aspects of enhanced engagement. The one area of Rothstein's prescription that bears further emphasis are the individual characteristic, attributes, and skills necessary and their corresponding training requirements. Engagement in often remote, poor, harsh, and sometimes dangerous sub-state environments demands soldiers with the traits common to SF. Civilian DOS operatives of a GEA would require most -- if not all -- of the same skills. In fact, such civilian operatives -- operating with only limited support from the embassy and being without the support typical of deployed soldiers -- would need to be unusually resourceful to be effective (and even, in some cases, survive). Since SF soldiers already have these traits, it seems reasonable to seek the nucleus of a new GEA in the ranks of retired or transitioned SF soldiers. Rothstein first identifies the following SOF and individual characteristics that already align with the requirements for conducting regional engagement:

[Personnel should be] mature professionals with leadership abilities; [Have] specialized skills, equipment, and tactics, Regional focus, Language skills, [and] Political and cultural sensitivity. [Moreover, units should be:] Small, flexible, [and with a] joint-force structure. {Furthermore; SOF should be able to: } Be tasked to organize quickly and deploy rapidly to provide tailored responses to many different situations; Gain access to hostile or denied areas; Provide limited security and medical support for themselves and those they support; Communicate worldwide with unit equipment.; Live in austere, harsh environments without extensive support; Survey and assess local situations and report these assessments rapidly; Work closely with regional military and civilian authorities and populations; Organize indigenous people into working teams to solve local problems; Deploy at low cost, with a low profile and less intrusive presence than larger conventional forces.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁷ Rothstein, H. (1999, June). pp. 34-35.

All of the above attributes are expected of currently-fielded SF units. Rothstein also identifies several skills that are non-traditional to the larger military (but common in SOF) that would require emphasis in the selection and training of effective REC (or GEP) soldiers.

The first and overriding individual training requirement for core regional engagement professionals is competence in U.S. tactics, techniques, procedures, and doctrine for decisive operations. This understanding of conventional force operations is the foundation for the effectiveness of the global scout, global shaper, and global transition forces. This common theoretical and cultural experience is what sets the global scout apart from other HUMINT sources. It permits synchronization of the actions of the global shaper and transition forces with the potential requirements for decisive operations in an AO based on common understanding of operational procedures and tactics. Conversely, many of the individual training requirements for regional engagement emphasize non-traditional skills, not routinely found in the military, particularly outside of SOF. Among these are: Regional orientation; Cross cultural communications; Sustained operations in austere environments; Sustained operations in isolation from other U.S. personnel or forces; Organization, capabilities, and procedures of OGAs; Expertise in the organization, capabilities, and procedures of NGOs, PVOs, and international organizations (e.g. the United Nations and regional security organizations); Civil-military skills such as advanced medical capabilities (to include training as an independent healthcare practitioner), civil engineering skills related to third world infrastructure, and civil administration; Political sensitivity (aware of both U.S. and indigenous political environment); Operations in low-tech/no-tech environments; Urban operations (specifically urban UW and Foreign Internal Defense [FID]); Intensive intelligence training to support the global scout role; Language proficiency; Negotiation skills; [and Information Operations] IO."¹¹⁸

These attributes are suitable and desirable for the strictly military context of the REC. The same attributes would be preferable in civilian GEP operatives as well.

1. Summary of the REC

Rothstein's REC concentrates on human qualities, continuous engagement, and a holistic conception of maintaining persistent presence in foreign areas. The REC provides a concept for understanding foreign environments, forewarning of possible threats coming from them, and influencing those environments to meet American interests. The

¹¹⁸ Rothstein, H. (1999, June). p. 40.

REC is an excellent vehicle for preventing strategic surprise and maintaining and securing the strategic initiative.

However, it is understandably but fatally referenced to a predominantly military-centric perspective. Military assets must change their posture in response to changes in American policy and international conditions. Although such changes are understandable, the frequent movements of military assets and their general impermanence are not conducive to plans for continuous presence and observation. Although bits of the REC concept surface occasionally in military thinking -- and USSOCOM could adopt the REC if it so chose, it has not yet been adopted as a mainstream military belief. Despite the manifest virtues and indirect promise of the plan, the military has not yet demonstrated that it has a preference for other than short-term instrumentality. The REC is likely to remain too narrowly conceived by the military as a marginal and uncomfortably strange adjunct to conventional military thinking.

B. A GRAND CONCEPTION FOR THE FUTURE (THE GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT PLAN).

The REC -- being kindred in spirit and intent with the GEP -- has been reviewed in some detail for its general wisdom and specific points of agreement and divergence. The following proposal for a GEP is not an argument that the REC is in any way wrong. It is an argument that the GEP is broader in scope, and places emphasis on a less directly instrumental and more fundamental starting point for American engagement in the world: permanent civilian presence in, continuous observation of, and sophisticated and unbroken streams of reporting on foreign human micro-environments. The REC's vision of utility is rooted in the instrumental focus of the military generally, the Army specifically, and military elements reporting ground truth to policy makers for the purpose of finessing better security policy. The GEP applauds and includes this vision.

The GEP however, is civilian controlled. Although GEP operatives would require the toughness and military virtues of the best current SF soldiers to succeed -- and this thesis assumes that early generations of GEP operatives would be heavily represented by former military personnel -- the GEP does not regard continuous engagement in reference to -- or relevance through -- military power. Resident in the DOS, the GEA would be an

extension of the American overseas missions' observation and reporting. It does, however, differ somewhat from the traditional conduct of DOS activities. Whereas DOS missions are assigned to capitols and major foreign cities, and conduct a majority of their activities through the foreign elites centered in those foreign centers of power, GEA operatives would extend the observation and reporting ability of embassies to sub-state, predominantly non-elite areas. The GEP is based on the fundamental premise that DOS GEA operatives would provide useful information to the American country team by being permanently assigned to fixed areas for observation and reporting. Such DOS augmentation, and the more comprehensive information-gathering coverage it would provide, should lead to better engagement by other instruments of American power.

The Rationale for a GEP.

The Global Engagement Plan described herein is based on several key assumptions:

1. The Regional Engagement Plan (REC) as described by Rothstein -- or a military plan very similar to it -- would provide a tremendous improvement in American military engagement. Despite the REC's conceptual argument for permanent and fixed -- and therefore reliably continuous -- American presence in many more areas of the globe, however, USSOCOM has so far not embraced such a concept. Moreover, it is limited by its military-referenced nature because the military tends to focus on more short-term instrumentality than continuous presence to fixed AOs. A new concept (the GEP) is intended to provide such permanent, fixed, and continuous presence with civilian operatives as an augmentation to DOS embassies, and with a charter to engage and understand fixed foreign areas. The GEP does not demand revolutionary change. It simply extends the mandate of existing American missions abroad.

2. The world will continue to integrate (or "globalize") more densely, and will be perceived as "contracting" by all the world's people; even if such perception occurs at different times, different rates, and with different conclusions for integration's significance.

3. Such globalization consists of increased connectedness with interaction between, and awareness of, nations, states (and their politics defined narrowly), politics

(broadly defined as interactions between human beings); economic systems, actors, and relationships; and social systems and norms (including value systems, philosophies and religious belief and conduct).

4. Actors will continue to pursue and order their own interests in accordance with their charter, *raison d'etre*, particular excellence, and/or for selfish reasons. Barring a purposeful initiative, such actor behavior represents an environment of chaos.

5. Despite prognostications implying the contrary,¹¹⁹ states will continue to exist for the foreseeable future, combining political authority, military/coercive and economic power, and the inertial advantages of traditional human ordering. States will continue to be the most powerful actors on the world stage.

6. Nevertheless and as widely observed, other actors and forces are increasingly perceived as complementing, challenging, threatening, or even potentially obviating the state.¹²⁰

7. Human interaction occurs at many levels and in many dimensions. Analysis on the "life of the state" can be deconstructed or "suprastructured" at different levels of resolution. Therefore the traditional, two-dimensional, rational actor concept of state -to-state (regime-to-regime) relations as the only level at, and paradigm through which, national matters of importance are ultimately important and can be understood is contestable.

8. A GEP, and the DOS Global Engagement Agency Operatives (GEOs) who would conduct it, can provide observation and reporting coverage of heretofore largely neglected/underreported environments below and apart from the traditional state-to-state focused effort of current American organizations and observers.

As noted and critiqued in chapter two, traditional American representation to foreign countries is state-to-state (regime-to-regime) through the American embassy. In many cases, larger and more important states will see the American embassy augmented by consulates. The American "Country Team" (Department of State and other official USG personnel) is habitually clustered in the vicinity of the American missions. It is in these concentrated areas that most official American personnel spend the majority of their

¹¹⁹ For several speculations about the possible erosion of the nation state see O'Meara, P. et. al. (2000).

¹²⁰ O'Meara, P. et. al. (2000).

tours in-country. Other than routine and normal relations between the embassy/consulates and the organs of the host nation government, observation -- and reporting based on direct observation -- is confined to the small area in the immediate vicinity of the mission sites (See Figure 2). Reporting to senior policy makers in America is mostly channeled through the Country Team.




Figure 2. Current/Typical Areas of Routine Coverage.

Ground truth in reporting conditions in the wider host nation is deliberately and consciously augmented and multiplied by developed ties with co-operative host nation nationals. These nationals are assumed to have access to current and reliable information beyond that which mission personnel have the time, ability, and access to collect for themselves. The host nation locals' coverage spread out away from the missions (See Figure 3).




Figure 3. Current/Typical Areas of Routine Coverage by Indigenous Co-Operatives.

Whenever the embassy requires information on a specific issue of current interest, the mission can dispatch an American observer to the specific area of interest for a temporary investigation. While this does occur, the majority of such "spiked" (tasked) coverage is conducted by the same indigenous co-operatives (See Figure 4).




Figure 4. Spiked/Tasked Coverage of Indigenous Co-Operatives.

This thesis in no way disparages the good offices of trusted indigenous co-operatives, nor the daily contribution they make to enhancing American information gathering. However, as outlined in chapter two, there are limitations and difficulties with using indigenous co-operatives (and the currently limited number of American embassy personnel) for such tasks. By contrast, and as part of an overall DOS engagement policy, the GEP envisions dividing the entire globe (and its constituent sovereign states) into GEP Areas of Operation/Responsibility (AOs) as an augmentation to existing DOS efforts. To the extent that such envisioned GEOs are available and the host nation allows expanded DOS representation in their country, GEOs would be posted to AOs on a virtually permanent basis. An abstract division of a notional host country into sub-national AOs is shown in Figure 5.




Figure 5. GEP Plan for Sub-National AOs.

Such sub-national AOs would not follow a rigid template, but would be determined by competent authority (in a "Global Engagement Agency") to align with significant ethnic, religious, cultural, and other demographic fault lines/groupings. As shown in Figure 6, traditional American mission reporting would continue normally following the assignment of the AOs.




Figure 6. GEP plan for Sub-National AOs with Current/Typical Areas of Routine Coverage Superimposed.

GEOs (augmented by Special Forces Teams when and where appropriate and in the context of the REC concept) would be posted into the AOs on a permanent/near-permanent basis (See Figure 7. The green icons represent GEOs and/or SF Teams as appropriate).




Figure 7. GEP Operative Assignments and/or SF Team Assignments in Country of Interest. The permanent/near-permanent presence of such GEOs/SF elements would dramatically expand observation and reporting coverage in the country of interest (See Figure 8) -- GEOs on a permanent basis as an augmentation to traditional and ongoing DOS efforts, and SF as appropriate and in the context of the REC. GEOs would routinely

report to a GEA representative on the Ambassador's staff at the embassy, and SF Teams would report to and through their specified, mission chain-of-command. Maximum benefit from such expanded observation and reporting by SF Teams functioning in such a "global scout" role would be obtained by close coordination and information sharing with the embassy. The promise of such maximum, enhanced information value should indicate to both the DOS and USSOCOM the imperative for interagency coordination and information sharing




Figure 8. GEP Expanded AO Coverage of Units Themselves and Reporting Chains.

As the continuous presence of GEOs and/or SF Teams matured, direct American observation and the observation of multiplied sub-national networks of indigenous co-operatives would diffuse throughout the entire country; expanding American information with an unprecedented comprehensiveness (See Figure 9).




Figure 9. GEP Expanded and Comprehensive AO Coverage and Reporting Chains.

From the view of senior policy/decision makers in America, the typical current (and traditional) process of gathering information upon which to make strategic decisions is represented in Figure 10. American officials track and develop information on "Known Knowns (KK) and" Known Unknowns (KU),"while worrying about what the "Unknown Unknowns (UU)" might be. This thesis argues that the basis of UU is overwhelmingly based on American ignorance of foreign human environments which are "Virtually Neglected (VN)"; i.e., those same human micro-environments outside of traditional, routine DOS observation and reporting. Although specific, targeted operations can be (and routinely are) targeted to fill-in information gaps, such "top-down" operations are characterized either by a "dead reckoning" approach to information gathering (i.e., starting from a "known" point), or blunder into virtually neglected areas (often ending in mission failure or worse). By the persistent and continuous presence of GEO and/or SF Team augmentation to traditional observation and reporting -- or as persistent and continuous as American and host nation limitations and restrictions will allow -- UU and VN AOs will diminish, providing a "bottom-up," inductive method for gathering information.




Figure 10. Typical Information Gathering Process for Strategic Decision-Making.

Moreover, while the traditional role for state-to-state relations is to encourage and support American policies in the host foreign *regime* (bilateral policy agreements, reforms to liberal democracy, etc.) from the top down, such efforts will continue to be limited by lack of information on sub-state conditions outside of host nation regime structures. Such systems often leave the ground truth on host countries conditions unreported/under-reported. While traditional American representation to the foreign nation should and would continue, the presence of GEOs (augmenting the DOS) and military SF Teams (when and where appropriate) would provide unprecedented coverage of underlying conditions (See Figure 11).




Figure 11. Routine Process for Strategic Decision-Making with GEP Operatives In-Place.

2. Summary of the GEP

With GEP operatives in-place the U.S. Government (USG) is provided: (1) observations and reporting on areas previously uncovered (immersed in areas that previously were Virtually Neglected and detecting the Unknown Unknowns); (2) a source of verification of the effectiveness and impact of American government engagement initiatives (both intended and unforeseen); (3) a source of verification of foreign state agencies'/operations' presence, effectiveness, impact (both intended and unforeseen), and compliance with bilateral agreements; (4) a gauge of the foreign state's sincerity in meeting USG expectations; (5) data input that will help to refine USG knowledge of AO, leading to the identification and understanding of foreign micro-groups which, in turn, should lead to better policy for, and operations by, other instruments of American power.

Military engagers -- such as SF soldiers in the context of a REC -- would be used in a military context, under military direction, and like the REC concept envisions, would be employed with as nearly continuous a presence as practicable. The flexibility of military SF soldiers however, would allow their movement where and as needed dependent on the current situation and national strategic priorities. By contrast, civilian operatives of the DOS GEA (GEOs) would be permanently fixed to their geographic

AOs. To the greatest extent achievable, DOS GEOs would remain dedicated to, and located in, fixed AOs for an entire career of augmentation to embassy observation and reporting.

The priority mission of SF soldiers in REC would vary according to changing conditions and military mission requirements. Observation and reporting might sometimes be the priority military mission, but at most other times observation and reporting would be a corollary to other mission priorities. By contrast, the priority mission of civilian DOS GEOs would be continuous observation and reporting of ground truth made possible by continuous presence and unparalleled expertise in their assigned AOs. To the extent that American and host nation limitations and restrictions allow GEOs to be located amongst the local host nation population, such presence provides an unprecedented expansion of embassy attention to previously under-reported human micro-environments.

IV. THESIS SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS

A. SUMMARY

America is currently the world's strongest military and economic power. Nevertheless, there are real limits to the reach of American power and influence, based on – among other things - a lack of information on, and a lack of consistent engagement in, the wider world. The reality is that America continues to engage the world officially and primarily as a national state in a familiar system of states in an otherwise anarchic world system. Current American government structures and methods of engagement with the world -- especially the mass majority of the world's population -- are inadequate to American security requirements in the 21st century. America requires a new and deliberate method for such engagement -- a level of engagement unusual to the traditional means of DOS representation, and unprecedented in its diffusion throughout, and permanent focus on, mass human communities in foreign nations. The method proposed is a Global Engagement Plan (GEP) that does not currently exist.

To meet the challenges of the twenty-first century – a century which promises continuing friction between the forces of modern globalization and traditional patterns of human order – America will need to make use of every available mode of engagement. It is therefore useful and necessary to periodically review the way in which America engages the world. This thesis argues that American security and national interests would be well-served by engaging the world in a deliberately diffused manner. A proposed Global Engagement Plan (GEP) would permanently place American civilian operatives in every micro-region of the world to observe and report information in human environments that are under-observed, and whose activities are under-reported. Such operatives would: (1) establish a permanent and continuous American presence at a foreign local level; (2) provide an additional means to observe and report ground truth of such foreign environments on an unprecedented scale; (3) provide open source human information on foreign populations and environments useful to verification of local conditions, foreign government behavior toward their population, and American Government agencies' and non-governmental organizations' (NGO) activities and effectiveness abroad; (4) present continuous and locally-derived foreign information

useful to the coordination of all the instruments of American national power during specific events and operations; (5) provide continuous information capture and reporting for the ongoing development of national databases and policy formation beyond specific events and operations; (6) serve, where appropriate, as liaisons between foreign local micro-environments and other manifestations of American engagement policy; (7) provide, when appropriate, in-place pilot teams and bases of operation for all other instruments of national power; and (8) provide, where appropriate, operative agents of American foreign policy in pursuing the stated American interests of spreading liberty, the rule of law, human rights, and free and fair trade.

B. CONCLUSIONS

1. Hypothesis Review

Hypothesis: This thesis' hypothesis is that traditional methods of USG engagement with foreign populations, while necessary, are nevertheless insufficient to observe and report on the majority of the world's population in a persistent, consistent, and long-term manner. If threats to America are believed to increasingly arise from such (predominantly non-elite) masses, it would be prudent to develop an ability to conduct such observation and reporting. Army SF has the charter to act as global scouts among their array of missions. The military, however, is most often focused on more short-term instrumentality in its use of SF. To reap more persistent, consistent, and long-term observation and reporting, the military could use a REC that focuses on more consistent presence. Given that military efforts (understandably) follow military rationales for employment, and such efforts are sometimes limited by their very military nature, it seems reasonable to make GEOs civilian operatives. Civilian operatives -- as part of the DOS mission -- would be more acceptable to many more foreign host nations than would the presence of American military personnel. Nevertheless, simply increasing the number of traditional FSOs is not an adequate solution. Permanent/near-permanent presence in such environments requires operatives to have the TTS common to SF soldiers. It is therefore recommended that such civilian DOS officials -- GEOs -- be drawn from retired/transitioned SF personnel.

2. Answers to the Research Questions.

1. Are the traditional instruments of American power sufficient for persistent, consistent, and long-term engagement with foreign human micro environments -- an engagement that results in continuous observation and reporting of mass human communities outside of the traditional corridors of power?

Traditional instruments of American power as currently structured and employed are not sufficient for persistent, consistent, and long-term engagement with foreign human micro environments. Possible threats to American interests emanating from mass (primarily non-elite) human communities outside of the traditional corridors of host nation power too often remain under-observed and under-reported on using current American instruments and procedures.

2. How can military observation and reporting be improved?

One method of greatly enhancing the military's role in engagement, observation, and reporting of foreign human micro-environments can be found in a Regional Engagement Concept (REC). The REC outlines how USSOCOM could better use its assets -- with Army Special Forces (SF) in the vanguard -- to provide improved American military engagement.

3. How might a civilian method of observation and reporting be conceived, and what new structure might be recommended to achieve this civilian method of observation and reporting?

Military assets typically respond to changeable national and military priorities. Therefore, very often military presence and engagement is impermanent in any given Area of Operation/Responsibility (AO). Such impermanent presence is not conducive to maintaining persistent and continuous levels of observation and reporting on any given AO. Assuming USSOCOM does not significantly change its method of utilizing SF, a solution to impermanent presence is to create a Global Engagement Plan (GEP) that would post DOS officials in fixed, sub-state AOs -- wherever appropriate and achievable -- to augment traditional DOS observation and reporting. Because such duty could be expected to be relatively harsh, demanding, and even more dangerous than typical DOS

foreign service, specially-recruited and prepared DOS civilian officials should populate a Global Engagement Agency (GEA) subordinate to the DOS. Such civilian GEA operatives (GEOs) would likely require the same temperaments, traits, and skills as those common to SF soldiers. It would be appropriate to further explore the idea of recruiting retired and/or transitioned SF soldiers for subsequent careers in a new GEA.

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